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Abstract 
This study set out to examine the opportunities and constraints for 
Zimbabwean civil society participation in African Union policy initiatives. The 
work came up after a realisation that there are serious challenges that inhibit 
participation of Zimbabwean civil society organisations (CSOs) in the policy-
making initiatives of the continental body. 
 The problem arises from the structure of the African Union (AU) in that it is an 
inter-state organ and, as such, any engagement with the African citizens has 
to be done through the various governments of members‘ states. 
This means that for Zimbabwean CSOs‘ voices to be heard in the AU policy-
making, they have to go through their Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
Zimbabwean situation is a very unique and problematic one in that the 
government and CSOs are sworn enemies. The animosity arises from the 
allegations by the government that the CSOs are part of a well-orchestrated 
plot led by the United States of America and Britain to effect illegal regime 
change in Zimbabwe. It is the argument of the ZANU PF government that the 
West is sponsoring the opposition as a response to the land redistribution 
exercise. Given this background, it has been difficult for CSOs to make their 
representations to the government.  
This work therefore sought to determine alternative avenues for engagement 
by CSOs. The research was done through interviews of 20 CSOs involved in 
issues of democracy and good governance. It also utilised a lot of secondary 
information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the AU. The 
research came to the conclusion that CSOs need to improve their working 
relations with the government and also try to utilise other avenues for 
engagement like the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). The 
work further concluded that the ―cat and mouse‖ relationship between the 
government and civil society in Zimbabwe has created a situation where the 
latter has been demonised, if not totally criminalised to the extent of limiting its 
access into mainstream AU affairs. This, in brief, has presented a situation 
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where the feasibility of a democratic experience in Zimbabwe becomes 
increasingly remote and misty. 
Zimbabwe‗s contribution to African political and economic life has been 
disabled by the Zimbabwean government‘s next to single-handed approach to 
African and international affairs. The absence of the Zimbabwean civil 
society‗s voice in the African economic and political life reduces Zimbabwe‘s 
place in African affairs to a narrow and shallow location. The democratic 
doctrine of multiplicity of voices and diversity of opinions, which are important 
ingredients of democracy as it is globally perceived, are negated by the 
Zimbabwean government‘s enduring interest to collapse the civil society to 
dormant national shareholders whose role is theoretical at the expense of 
being real and meaningful.  
At a prima facie level, the Zimbabwean civil society is an isolated and 
hindered entity through legislation and economic and political conditions that 
the Zimbabwean government has caused. On the other hand, on a point of 
strategy and creative positive thought, this creates a window of opportunities 
and some interesting challenges to the actors and players in the Zimbabwean 
civil society to generate methods and approaches relating to the greater 
African economic and political reality without the co-operation, or the consent, 
of the Zimbabwean government. This presents a case study to the test of 
Africa and the globe that governance is not only a preserve of the 
governments, but is an all-inclusive process that must also involve non-state 
actors, lest it becomes a partisan and narrow meaningless affair. That, in the 
African context, can be summarised in a West African saying that ―no matter 
how big your hand is, it can not cover the sky‖. In this context, no matter how 
big the AU can be, it cannot adequately serve the interests of the whole of 
Africa without involving other key players like the civil society movement. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
There has been an increase in calls for wider and more effective participation 
of civil society organisations (CSOs) in the developmental and governance 
processes of continental and global organisations. These loud calls have seen 
attempts and great strides being made towards the creation of strong 
continental structures aimed at achieving solid partnerships and co-operation 
between states and their citizens. The establishment of the African Union (AU) 
demonstrates steady progress in Africa‘s quest for ownership of its own 
agenda. It has been described as constituting a historic opportunity for the 
revival of the Pan African spirit in the face of the waves of globalisation. The 
AU was formed to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), formed in 
1963. Evidence is already emerging of a stronger, more co-ordinated African 
voice in the international arena. The World Vision Report (2006, 72), states 
that,  
The articulation of a desire to build a people centred Union constitutes the 
clearest statement yet that Africa has put autocratic rule behind it and is 
ready to proceed along participatory democratic and accountable 
trajectory  
The AU‘s desire to promote civil society participation in the policy processes of 
continent is clearly articulated in the in the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union and its Strategic Plan (2004 ).The role of the AU is best summarised in 
Figure 1 below. The diagram indicates that the AU Commission is at the 
centre of spearheading leadership in areas of comparative advantage like 
peace and security. It also plays the role of coordination of various positions 
and interests in negotiations at the global level. The AU also has the role of 
coordination of harmonisation of socio economic policies as well as being a 
change agent in setting up and monitoring of common standards in policy 
making. 
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Figure 1.1: Role of the African Union 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
(Source: AU Strategic Plan 2004-2007 page 12) 
The avenues for participation of civil society in various policy initiatives of the 
AU are provided for in the Pan African Parliament (PAP), the New Partnership 
for Africa‘s Development (NEPAD), the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM), the Regional and Economic Communities (REC), as well as the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). ECOSOCC is the official 
platform of the AU for CSOs to interface but they can choose to interface at 
any level with any organ or department. Detailed documents on the founding 
statutes and related information on each of these organisations is available in 
Chapter 4.  
The increased calls for civil society participation are motivated by a belief that 
to promote good governance, there is need for a deliberate strengthening of 
citizens‘ involvement in public policy processes. This is in line with the notion 
of deliberative policy-making which challenges the citizens and civil society 
actors to engage and influence government decision-making processes. This 
approach seeks to give a voice to the voiceless and is based on an important 
assumption that public participation in public policy is an important tool for 
development. It therefore encourages that all public institutions have to take 
the attitude and activities of the institutions constituting civil society into 
account when making decisions and implementing these decisions. It is 
recommended that for African governments to promote good governance 
there is need for strengthening of citizens‘ involvement. This is also true of the 
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AU which, in its attempts to create vibrant and meaningful continental 
development initiatives, has to take on board civil society voices. 
This work recognises the importance of this engagement, more generally by 
exploring the opportunities and constraints of engagement for the 
Zimbabwean civil society in the AU policy initiatives. Important questions can 
be raised as to why the focus is on Zimbabwean civil society interactions at a 
continental level when there are national structures through which such 
engagement can be done. In other words, the issues of why the researcher 
had to leap to the continent and, most importantly, the thematic reasons for 
this interface. This study and the specific focus on Zimbabwean civil society 
are important in that they can unravel the constant suspicions between civil 
society and any governmental policy initiatives. This problem arises from the 
fact that the AU is an inter-state organ and, as such, engagement has to be 
done through government structures. However in the Zimbabwean context, 
there is a bad working relationship between the government and CSOs as the 
two do not see eye to eye. This has had an adverse effect on representation 
of CSO voices in the AU because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs disregards 
their views at the AU engagement level. This suspicion has had a negative 
impact on how the Zimbabwean government development initiatives influence 
the continental policy initiatives.  
The effects of this cat-and-mouse relationship cannot be clearer than in the 
Zimbabwean context. In this context, the question of deliberative democracy 
and the notions on invitation become contentious as civil and, in some 
instances, uncivil, organisations wanting to engage with the state-driven 
initiatives are perceived as threatening. This is an undesirable situation 
because, in most instances, citizens just want to be part of decisions that 
affect their lives. Zimbabwe, with its current economic collapse, is seeking 
means and ways of solving her problems, yet at the same time it ignores the 
views of civil society who are the voices of the masses. This challenge of a 
suspicious relationship arises from the government perception of CSOs as a 
tool of the West to effect illegal regime change in the country. As a result of 
this, civil society input has been ignored, yet they have vital ideas that can 
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help improve governance in the country. CSOs have started to direct their 
lobby campaigns to regional and continental organisations like the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and the AU. It is my argument that, 
in the absence of effective democratic governance within the country, it is vital 
for CSOs to be extra creative in order to find alternative routes to influence 
policy-making at AU level.  
The purpose of this research is to determine the alternative avenues that can 
be used by Zimbabwean non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to bypass 
the government red tape to get to the AU level. 
In this research, civil society organisations referred to are NGOs. Specific 
focus is on those that deal with promotion of democracy and good governance 
issues. A study will be done on 20 Zimbabwean organisations stated below. 
Profiles of these organisations are attached in the appendices.  
 Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), 
 Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) 
 National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) 
 Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition  
 Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust (ZIMCET) 
 Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) 
 Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), 
  Bulawayo Dialogue Institute  
 Leadership Institute for Transformation and Social Change  
 .Zimbabwe Human Rights Trust , 
 Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) 
  Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association (ZWLA) 
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 Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) 
 Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development 
 Uluntu Platform 
 Christian Alliance 
 Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) 
 Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) 
Each of these organisations represents a solid constituency of Zimbabweans 
that have a desire to see the country following the path of democratic 
governance. Most importantly, these organisations were created to open 
spaces for public participation in governance of the country and also create 
avenues for channelling of these views to national, continental and 
international bodies 
1.2 Statement of Research Problem 
The policy-making and decision architecture of the AU is designed to facilitate 
intergovernmental interface. Policy inputs from different countries are 
channelled through the foreign affairs ministries and the Heads of State. What 
this means is that all citizens that have a desire to contribute in the policy-
making process of the AU have to engage through the respective government 
foreign relations structure. Civil society organisations therefore have to 
channel their policy inputs and proposals through the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs .This situation is ideal as it attempts to discourage cumbersome 
engagements at the AU. However, it presents problems in countries like 
Zimbabwe, where the relations between the government and CSOs is heavily 
strained due to suspicions by the former that the CSOs‘ movement is a 
creation of the West to destabilise the country and effect illegal regime 
change. The net effect of this animosity is that the Zimbabwean CSOs‘ voice 
is unheard at the AU level because there is no interface between the CSOs 
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and Foreign Affairs ministry, which is supposed to be the channel of the voices 
of all Zimbabwean players. 
The situation creates a dangerous information gap as only the side, that of 
government, is heard yet civil society and all other social formations have an 
important role to play in the policy and governance processes of the continent. 
This broader engagement ensures that there is an interactive relationship 
between the governed and the governors, as there is no single actor who has 
the knowledge and resource capacity to tackle problems unilaterally. 
The African Union Strategic Plan (2004-2007) states that a united and strong 
Africa can only be achieved through solidarity, partnership and co-operation 
between states and their citizens. This creates a framework for Africa‘s 
development based on the creation of well-defined institutional structures and 
effective linkages between various processes and initiatives that seek to 
develop it. However, the power and political dynamics in the policy processes 
of the continent have undermined the participation of CSOs, the clearest 
example being in Zimbabwe. This is made worse by the fact that the AU is an 
inter-governmental organisation and civil society movements are expected to 
engage through their governments, yet in Zimbabwe the relations between 
government and CSOs are heavily strained as alluded to above. 
The problem is that while the AU provides some spaces for civil society 
participation, these spaces are not publicised enough to civil society and, in 
the end, the Zimbabwean government deliberately monopolises these 
avenues for participation. What has worsened the situation is that relations 
between CSOs and governments and inter-governmental institutions have 
been conducted on an ad hoc basis or by invitation. What is desired is to have 
Zimbabwean CSOs participating directly in the AU policy initiatives. This is 
critical especially for Zimbabwe as the national crisis, characterised by a 
collapse of governance and the economy, requires attention at continental and 
global level. Engagement by Zimbabwean CSOs in the creation of policies that 
promote deliberative democracy is important. The current setup where the 
government views CSOs with suspicion and accuses them of being agents of 
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regime change, have created a gulf between the two. This has not helped 
solve national problems at all. 
 
Zimbabwean civil society attempts to engage directly with the AU has been 
unproductive as the continental body interfaces with states. While the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) has been created as the 
interface between civil society and the AU, it is not properly co-ordinated and 
equipped to seriously deal with a CSO/AU interface. The critical problem is, 
how then do the Zimbabwean CSOs circumvent the red tape and engage 
directly at the level of AU? 
 
This work therefore seeks to investigate the opportunities and constraints for 
Zimbabwe civil society participation in the AU policy and development 
initiatives particularly the New Economic Partnership for Africa‘s Development 
(NEPAD), Pan African Parliament (PAP), ECOSOCC and the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM). 
1.3 Core argument  
According to Peters (2004), politics refers fundamentally to the relations of 
power and influence between states and their societies (and a more or less 
wide range of interests within them) and, in particular, to that complex set of 
processes whereby governments come to choose between a variety of 
collective goals for society and seek to implement them. In a functioning 
democracy, it is thus important to ensure that the citizenry participates 
effectively in governance. This is particularly important because the active 
participation of citizens in the process of deliberation helps in the alignment of 
the policy decisions of governance. It has been argued by some critics like 
Hyden (1999) that legitimate democratic public participation is vital because 
the authoritative decisions imposed by governments demand the justification 
from those burdened by authority and this justification must appeal to 
evidence and arguments acceptable to reasonable citizens. 
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At the core of my argument is that democracy is an ideal of popular 
sovereignty in which the legitimacy of the governors is ultimately assessed in 
terms of the judgements of those under that rule. The citizens are also an 
integral part of the governance process, as argued by Kalu (2004) that the 
interaction of people, ideas and institutions provides the focus for 
understanding how values are allocated and resources distributed. Thus, as 
argued by Foucault (1994), analyses of who gets what, when, how, why and 
where are central, as are concepts of power, justice, order, conflict, legitimacy, 
accountability, obligation, sovereignty and decision-making. As Africa moves 
closer to the creation of an African Union Government, institutions like the AU 
should thus be more vigorous in the operationalisation of citizens‘ participation 
in governance of the continent. It is in this context that Zimbabwean civil 
society has to participate actively in the formulation of the Union policies so 
that an independent voice of Zimbabwean communities is also heard. The 
current setup of the AU militates against this participation in a number of ways. 
The AU modus operandi is geared towards promotion of states‘ participation in 
the policy initiatives of the continent and excludes the CSOs‘ voices .Spaces 
created through ECOSOCC are limited and cannot effectively promote 
meaningful participation .It is important to have the input of non-state actors in 
the AU policy initiatives, hence the focus of this study on how Zimbabwean 
CSOs can directly interface with the AU. 
But if the participation is promoted only through the state, the question arises 
on how this is feasible in countries like Zimbabwe where the state and CSOs 
are at loggerheads. This shows that in a setup like that one, the CSOs‘ input 
into the continental body is very limited. The glaring reality is that this stifles 
participation, hence the need for crafting of other avenues to promote this 
engagement.  
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1.4 Primary Research Questions 
Given the national blockade of Zimbabwean civil society participation in the 
AU policies making, what other options are available? 
This is an important question that needs to be attended to urgently as the 
Zimbabwean government views civil society organisations involved in 
governance issues as agents of regime change of what they term the 
―imperialist West‖. This has not only stifled their operations at national level, 
but has seriously limited their opportunities for influencing policies at regional 
and continental level. The architecture of the AU encourages inter-state 
interface and assumes that there are avenues available for citizens to channel 
their views through governmental structures. However, the Zimbabwean 
situation is different in that the government ignores the voices of civil society 
players and, as such, most of the policy inputs it makes to the continental 
body ignore the voices of civil society movements. This has resulted in 
Zimbabwean CSOs‘ views on policy development at a continental level not 
being well-transmitted due to the bad blood with government. The net effect of 
this blockade is that Zimbabwean civil society has found it difficult to 
participate meaningfully in the AU policy initiatives. Their scope of influence 
has thus remained confined to Zimbabwe, yet they can contribute 
meaningfully to the entire development of the continent. The key issue, as 
already defined, is to make a determination of the opportunities and 
constraints for Zimbabwean CSOs‘ participation in the policy initiatives and 
how this can assist national, regional and continental development. 
Secondary research questions are: 
 Do existing institutional and spaces for CSOs‘ participation in the decision-
making architecture and policy-making framework of the AU allow for 
participation of organisations from Zimbabwe? 
 What are the constraints and political power dynamics that stifle 
Zimbabwean CSOs‘ participation in the AU policy initiatives? 
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 Is there a well co-ordinated CSOs movement for engagement with the AU 
and in which policy initiatives is it directed? 
 Is the Zimbabwean CSOs movement well capacitated to participate in the 
spaces provided by the AU as well as contribute meaningfully to 
strengthening policies and Africa s position in the international arena? 
 If there is already some engagement between the AU and the Zimbabwean 
CSOs, what activities characterise this engagement? 
 Is the relationship between the government of Zimbabwe and the CSOs 
facilitative or limiting for an effective engagement in policy formulation, 
implementation and monitoring in the AU policy organs? 
1.4 Limitations/Constraints 
The relationships between government and Zimbabwean civil society 
organisations are strained and, as such, it may be difficult to get well-defined 
information on the areas of co-operation. This might be misinterpreted as 
unacceptable limitation since the study is on the AU and Zimbabwean civil 
society and not the government and civil society. However, the fact that the 
AU is an inter-state organisation and that the input from the CSOs has to be 
channelled through the government, the strained relationship of Zimbabwean 
CSOs and the government presents serious information gathering challenges 
for this research. 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework for CSOs 
Participation in Policy-making 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to explore literature that has been developed in the area of 
inclusion and participation of citizens in governance. The study will rely on 
secondary literature from journals, internet, textbooks, African Union statutes 
and protocols, among others. The aim of going through the literature is to 
inform and direct the study based on researches and experiences previously 
encountered. It will assist to provide the research with adequate information 
on how similar cases have been dealt with before and then arm the researcher 
with tools as how best to approach the research. Previous literature in the 
same area of study is important for any researcher as it informs the theories 
and case studies for the research. The chapter is crafted in the following way. 
It first addresses general theories on democratic governance and the 
importance of public participation. It looks at works by such important scholars 
in public affairs like King, Foucault, McLennan, and Mafumanisa, among 
others. After that, it explores the statutes that create the important policy 
bodies that are provided for by the AU. These are then critically analysed with 
a view of how they can inform the participation of Zimbabwean civil society 
organisations in the African Union Policy Agenda. The AU organs scrutinised 
are: ECOSOCC, NEPAD, APRM, PAP, Commission, Assembly and the 
Permanent Representative Council (PRC). It is, however, important to start by 
defining civil society in the context of this study. 
2.2 Conceptualisation of civil society 
In this study, civil society is defined as those organisations that are completely 
divorced from legislative and judicial power of the state. These organisations 
include, but are not limited to, labour unions, advocacy groups, religious 
groups, cultural and educational associations, student groups adhering to their 
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own rules and code of conduct. Activities of civil society are important in the 
running of any state. According to Mafumanisa (2004:490), it is important that 
―public institutions in making decisions and implementing these decisions have 
to take into account the attitude and activities of the institutions constituting 
civil society‖.  
This work focuses on civil society movements that are involved in the 
promotion of democratisation and good governance. It will also thus focus on 
those AU policies that are aimed at achieving these two stated thematic areas. 
The work seeks to ascertain ways in which the CSOs movement in Zimbabwe 
can effectively contribute to the AU policy initiatives .These avenues are what 
the work perceives as the opportunities for participation in the AU policy 
structures while the constraints are those barriers both at national and 
continental level that hinder the participation of CSOs in the policy-making 
initiatives of the continental grouping. 
2.3 The theoretical framework 
Zimbabwean civil society movements, like all other stakeholders in 
governance of the country, have an inherent right to participate actively in 
policy-formulation initiatives that affect the country. This is particularly 
important as it encourages inclusive and accountable governance to develop 
equitable democratic consensus. Facilitation of citizens‘ participation in the 
policy-making organs buffers the public from state domination. This is what 
Habermas (1987:364) says provides ―effective restraining barriers to protect 
civil society from state domination‖. The same argument is shared by Kohn 
(2000) and Medearis (2005:87) who argue that ―disempowered actors who 
carve out autonomous spaces and act coercively against dominant interests 
can influence governance outcomes better than those collaborating with 
governing elites‖. It is in this light that this study argues that involvement of 
civil society movements from Zimbabwe in the African Union Policy initiatives 
will promote collaborative governance. For the AU to be very successful in its 
programmes, it needs to embrace the notion forwarded by Loundes et al 
(2006:552), which states that ―responsiveness is a pre-condition of efficiency 
 23 
and creation of public value demands participatory governance through 
dialogue with citizens‖. Indeed, effective governance stems from deliberative 
democracy, which    Dryzek (2000 :781)  defines as ―the essence of 
democratic legitimacy should be sought in the ability of all individuals subject 
to a collective decision‖. In this manner deliberative democracy entails not only 
citizens‘ participation, but also equal access to decisions by all citizens with a 
stake in them. 
 This process requires that the affected actors be included in the construction 
of an open-ended policy discourse and also have a voice and an opportunity. 
This view is further shared by Skelcher (2005) who advocates an associational 
solution in which the agents of the community should be given a veto over 
partnership decisions as a guarantee against domination by their powerful 
counterparts. He advocates for what Skelcher (2003:101) calls 
consociationalism which underpins a ―democratic policy-forming‖ model of 
governance where disadvantaged groups can have an equal voice. 
 The importance of opening avenues for participation by a wider group of 
citizens in governance is what gives alternative voices and ideas spaces to 
compete effectively in shaping policies that would affect them. Kohn 
(2000:425) argues that ―the separation or critical distance permits the creation 
of protected space, where social movements can explore and test genuinely 
alternative ways of framing collective problems.‖ In this manner, there is need 
for community empowerment and strategic co-ordination by CSOs to influence 
policy-making at the level of AU. The challenge faced by Zimbabwean CSOs 
is that the AU is an inter-state organ, and as such, engagement is usually at 
the level of government, leaving very little or no space for civil society. The 
situation is worsened by the bad relations between CSOs and government, 
hence the need for creation of new avenues and opportunities.  Davies 
(2007:789) argues that: 
if governing institutions tend to reproduce the interests of dominant 
groups, then the disempowered have to build new institutions, incubating 
alternative approaches capable of gaining widespread acceptance and 
influence. 
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To that end, CSOs in Zimbabwe, being networks for national development, 
have a duty to ensure that they promote citizens‘ participation in governance 
in line with Sorensen and Torfing‘s (2005) argument that: 
The post liberal theories of democracy render it possible to see how 
governance networks might contribute in new important ways of organising 
and regulating processes of democratic policy making process assists in 
the alignment of policy decisions with overall objectives of national 
development. 
McLennan (2007) concurs with the above notion and argues that the 
legitimacy of those in power depends on the extent to which they are able to 
use and sustain governance rules in relation to policy development and 
implementation. She further argues that ―a consequence of effective 
governance is the legitimacy or social capital that is the engagement of 
citizens in public issues‖. This approach is effective and leads to good 
governance because the art of government, according to Foucault (1994:15), 
is essentially concerned with answering the question of how to introduce the 
economy. He argues that: 
to govern a state will therefore mean to apply the economy, to set up an 
economy at the level of an entire state, which means exercising it towards 
its inhabitants and wealth behaviour of each and all a form of surveillance 
and control as attentive as that of head of family over his household and 
goods. 
It is in the same light that Leftwich (1993:25) argues that governance needs to 
be understood fundamentally as the provision of direction to the economy and 
society. He further argues that ―stated more simply, governance involves 
deciding upon collective goals for the society and then devising the 
mechanism through which these goals can be attained‖. In order to attain the 
goals and objectives of development by the state or inter-state organs, there is 
a need for effective involvement of citizens. Leftwich (1993 ) states that ―there 
should be an inextricable bond in the relations of the state and citizens in the 
making and implementing public policy‖ because formal structures are not the 
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only ones involved in governance. This is important as governance is not only 
the business of government, but a whole cross section of the citizens.  
According to Hyden (1999 ), ―a tendency for most countries has been to 
increase the involvement of non-government actors with networks playing 
increasingly important roles both in advocating policy and implementing public 
programmes.‖ This is not only true at the level of national government, but 
also at the level of multilateral groupings like the AU as effective governance 
requires extensive citizenry participation as argued by Hyden (ibid.:28) that 
―the capacity of a political system to provide governance to a society is 
therefore very much affected by the structure of institutions and the manner in 
which these institutions interact with each other.‖ It therefore follows that there 
is a need for greater interactions between civil society movements and the AU 
for development of policies that promote continental growth. Participation of 
citizens in governance ensures accountability in which the governed can 
exercise influence over their governors.‖ 
In post-independence Africa, especially in Zimbabwe, the government has 
alienated civil society from developmental activities. This is line with Kalu‘s 
(2004: 14) argument that: 
The trend in post independence politics in most African countries has 
been to disintegrate the civil public realm inherited from the colonial 
powers and replace it with rivalling communal or primordial realms, all 
following their own informal rules. 
He further argues that this has resulted in four shortcomings which have led to 
bad governance in Africa. These shortcomings are: 
1. The personalised nature of rule 
2. The frequent violation of human rights 
3. The lack of delegation by central authorities 
4. The tendency for individuals to withdraw from politics 
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The marginalisation of civil society, according to Kalu (ibid.:20): 
Has been effected to curb any independent political activities outside an 
institutional network controlled by a ruling party. By curbing associated life, 
African regimes have fostered blind compliance and a lack of concern for a 
strong public realm. 
This is against the much heralded current models of governance, in which 
governance is viewed essentially as the increased role of non-governmental 
actors in policy-making and generally regarded as implying an increasingly 
complex set of state society relationships in which networks, rather than 
hierarchies, dominate the policy-making process. Kooiman (1993) argues that 
from a governance perspective, the process of governing is an interactive one 
because no single actor has the knowledge and resource capacity to tackle 
problems unilaterally. 
The arguments forwarded above essentially focus on what Sloat (2002) calls 
the co-ordination of multiple actors and institutions to debate, define and 
achieve policy goals in complex political arenas such that the state no longer 
dominates the public policy-making process and decisions are made by 
problem-solving rather than bargaining. In this way, democratic governance 
can be achieved in the AU as argued by King (2004) that democracy is an 
ideal of popular sovereignty, according to which legitimacy is ultimately 
assessed in terms of judgements of those concerned. Indeed, democracy is a 
system of bargaining among various interests, hence the advocacy by this 
study for inclusion of Zimbabwe civil society in the African Union Policy 
agenda. 
2.4 Framework for CSO participation in the African 
Union 
It is the responsibility of governing institutions to ensure that they formulate 
policies that create a conducive environment for good governance and further 
create structures for continuous feedback to the public in order to maintain 
accountability to the governed. It is a generally accepted position that public 
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participation in governance is not a favour by government to its citizens, it is a 
right and the governments have a duty to effect it. The same also goes for 
continental governance structures. The AU offers space and platform for civil 
society engagement in its policy initiatives, but the platform has lots of 
limitations, especially in Zimbabwe.  
The AU Constitutive Act (2000) reads: 
Guided by our common vision of a united and strong Africa and by the 
need to build a partnership between governments and all segments of 
civil society, in particular, women, youth and the private sector. 
Article 3 of the Constitutive Act further provides for the AU to promote 
principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance, 
promote and protect human rights and people‘s rights in accordance with the 
African Charter on human and people‘s rights and other human rights 
instruments. Article 4 of the same Act provides for ―the participation of African 
people in the initiatives of the Union‖. Further to that, in its Strategic Plan 
document (2004-2007), citizens of Africa are a Priority Programme 2. The 
following objectives are advanced: 
 To ensure that the talent and resources and dynamism of the African 
people and the Diaspora are fully utilised in the implementation of the 
programmes of the AU. 
 To enhance the meaning and value of citizenship in Africa, and 
establish the overall transparency and accountability of the AU to the 
African people. 
Among some of the activities, the plan recommended: 
 The establishment of adequate frameworks for the full participation of 
various groups in the society in the activities of the AU. 
 Developing the AU network 
a. National commissions at the level of each member state. 
b. AU delegations to the Regional Economic Commissions (REC) 
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c. AU offices 
d. APRM Headquarters 
The establishment of ECOSOCC as the principal formal channel through 
which the voice of the civil society organisations can be heard in the AU: 
 The establishment at national and regional levels of consultative 
frameworks. 
 Supporting Pan African civil society organisations and networks 
including financial support and observer status. 
 Systematic civil society and private sector meetings before each AU 
summit  
The objectives stated above clearly show that civil continental bodies must 
work towards the interests of the citizens as argued by Mbogori (2006), that 
the sooner the civil society sector understands these bodies and the stages 
they have reached in their evolution, the better they will be prepared to interact 
with them and hopefully infuse them with the human face that they invariably 
will require if they are to genuinely serve the needs of citizens of both the 
region as well as the continent as a whole. This will lead to the ultimate goal of 
all citizens securing ownership of all African Institutions in the manner that 
ensures accountability and enhances their value to each African. This 
strengthens the case for participation of citizens in policy processes of the 
continent in order to achieve what Mbogoni (ibid.) describes as the need to 
perceive Africans as part of a larger continental infrastructure which we have a 
duty to constitute and maintain. He further argues that it is in the spirit of 
deliberative democracy to ensure that it promotes citizens‘ participation in 
decision-making in what he vehemently makes a pronouncement that 
organised civil society and those with access to resources have to engage in 
initiatives that promote the poor, marginalised and unorganised to have 
access and participate in policy decisions.  
One of the main problems faced by Africa is that it has very weak institutions, 
mechanisms and structures for public participation in decision-making 
processes at the continent level, regional economic blocs and national 
governments. Participation of civil society organisations in the AU policy-
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making initiatives ensures that the inter-state body does not become a mere 
extension of governmental interests. If citizens do not engage, then these 
institutions remain both untransformed and undemocratic. Landsberg and 
Mckay (2005:16) states that, ―the challenge is transformation and thus can 
only happen by means of critical and independent engagement by civil 
society.‖ Such a transformation paradigm could be found in a deliberative 
policy-making approach which challenges citizens and civil society actors 
grabbing the mandate to participate and play oversight and representative 
roles in governance and decision-making.‖ 
The main reason for advocating active citizens‘ involvement in the policy-
crafting initiatives of the continent is to ensure collectivity in addressing 
Africa‘s ―big issues‖. These big issues, according to Landsberg (ibid.), are 
concerned with: 
 Reducing poverty. 
 Social development, including addressing HIV/AIDS, unemployment 
and illiteracy.  
 Enduring wars and conflicts. 
 Promoting peace-building. 
 A new trade regime that is both free and just. 
 Promoting human rights and democratic governance. 
 Fostering regional integration and co-operation; and  
 Seeking a ―new‖ partnership with the outside. world notably 
industrialised powers.  
Civil society in Zimbabwe has to urgently engage seriously into the African 
Union Policy agenda to ensure that the continental body and national 
governments steer people-centred programmes. Landsberg and McKay 
(2005:11) states that: 
While civil society engagement remains poor, inter-state institutions and 
programmes are building strong policy and programmatic synergies and 
coherence amongst themselves. And as long as civil society actors fail to 
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engage strategically, it will remain difficult to steer these institutions and 
programmes in more people oriented directions. 
To that end, a number of models and principles for engagement are proposed 
by civil society actors, including Landsberg and  McKay (2005). Part of the 
framework proposes that: 
 Civil society actors should have the freedom to express their views 
concerning all issues of national importance regardless of how the state 
negatively views the same, 
 African technocrats and exceptional skilled intellectuals in various 
developmental areas must be involved in the debates for continental 
transformation. 
 There is need to widen and strengthen the scope of inclusion of 
participants from all strata of continental and national government in 
Africa. Inclusion and accommodation should be sought at all levels.  
 There is need for a high degree of honesty, integrity and accountability 
by both the government players and civil society movements. 
 Government and civil society actors must ensure co-operation is based 
on achieving developmental goals. 
 All the players involved in the African developmental agenda should 
commit and live to the commitments of genuinely transforming the 
African society. 
The World Vision (2007), report on Africa-wide CSOs Advocacy Strategy for 
Africa proposes the following Modes of Engagement with the African Union: 
 CSO as Technocrat: it is clear that increasingly significant expertise 
and resources reside in CSOs. The AU commission recognises this and 
taps into that capacity. This is an important entry point for CSOs but it 
does raise the issue of power and who determines the agenda. 
 CSO as Advocate: the AU and CSOs are both advocates, so this is 
about a division of labour that helps the AU overcome its lack of country 
presence or mechanism to implement continental norms in countries. 
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 CSOs as Implementer: some NGOs have strong country presence 
and can harness this to help implement AU initiated norms and 
standards.  
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at the framework for engagement by non state actors in 
the governance of national and international institutions. It gave well 
articulated information on the theoretical framework to do with citizens‘ 
participation in governance.  
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Chapter Three: Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter makes an in-depth presentation of the research methodology 
used in conducting this research. The research is conducted mainly using a 
qualitative research methodology .The qualitative research methodology is 
preferred because it starts with general research questions rather than a 
specific hypothesis and, as such, allows for considerable use of inductive 
reasoning. It gives room for analysis which is then used to draw inferences 
about larger and more general phenomena. This method is preferred because 
it is likely to present a holistic and detailed picture of the opportunities and 
constraints for Zimbabwean civil society participation in the policy processes 
of the African Union. It is the considered view of this researcher that the 
approach will allow for capturing of views and perceptions of all the actors 
across the political, economic and social divide. This is an important issue of 
consideration as the research objective demands an accurate and detailed 
analysis of the above stated issue .In terms of the data collection, the 
researcher personally carried out the interviews in the selected organisations. 
3.2 Theoretical grounding of the methodology 
Theory frames how we look and think about a topic. It gives us concepts, 
provides fundamental assumptions, gives direction to the important questions 
and suggests useful ways for us to make sense of data. Neuman (1997:56) 
states that, 
Theory and research are interrelated. Once the naïve researcher 
mistakenly believes that theory is irrelevant to research or that a researcher 
just collects the data, they easily fall into the trap of lazy and vague 
thinking, faulty logic, and imprecise concepts. 
There are three important and tested theoretical approaches to research. 
These are Positivism, Interpretive Social Science (ISS) and Critical Social 
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Science (CSS). This researcher is inspired by the CSS and, as such, the 
methodology will be grounded on that theory. In the justification for the use of 
this theory, a comparative analysis will be made with other theories so as to 
justify why it was given preference. 
3.2.1 Positivist Social Science 
Neuman (1997:63) broadly defines Positivism as an approach of natural 
science. Varieties of positivism go by names such as logical empiricism, the 
accepted or conventional view, positivism, naturalism, the covering law model 
and behaviourism. 
Positivist researchers prefer precise quantitative data and often use experiment and 
statistics. It seeks rigorous, exact measures and ―objective‖ research and they test 
hypotheses by carefully analysing numbers from the measures. 
However, it has been criticised as reducing people to numbers and that its 
concerns with abstract laws or formulas are not relevant to actual lives of real 
people. 
Scholars like Neuman (1997:63) indicate that 
Positivism sees social science as an organised method for combining 
deductive logic with precise empirical observations of individual behaviour 
in order to discover and confirm a set of probabilistic caused laws that can 
be used to predict general patterns of human activity. 
To that end, positivist theorists assert that scientists are engaged in a never-
ending quest for knowledge. Positivists view human beings as self-interested, 
pleasure-seeking and rational individuals. Durkheim (1938, 27) states that 
―social phenomena are things and ought to be studied as things‖. 
Turner: (1985:39) states that ―Social universe is amenable to the development 
of abstract laws and can be tested through careful collection of data.‖ It is a 
technical interest that assumes knowledge can be used as a mechanism to 
fulfil human wants and control the physical. Positivists argue that social reality 
is not random; it is patterned and has order. Without this assumption (i.e. if the 
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world were chaotic and without regularity) logic and prediction would be 
impossible. To them the basic observational laws of science are generally 
true, primary and certain, because they are built into the fabric of the natural 
world. 
To them there is a clear demarcation between science and non-science. 
Science takes a lot from common sense but it replaces the parts of common 
sense that are sloppy, illogical, inconsistent, unsystematic and full of bias. 
Neuman (1997) views positivists scientific explanation as nomothetic (nomos 
— law in Greek). It is based on systematic general laws. According to him, 
positivism assumes that the laws operate according to strict logical reasoning. 
Positivists argue for a value free science that is objective. It sees science as a 
specific distinctive part of society that is free of personal, political or religious 
values. 
Neuman (1997:67) argues that the positivist view on values has had an 
immense impact on how people see ethical issues and knowledge 
to the degree that a positivist theory of scientific knowledge has become the 
criterion of all knowledge, moral insights and political commitments have 
been delegitimised as irrational or reduced to mere subjective inclination. 
This view is shared Brown (1989:37), who argues that: 
a positivist approach implies that a researcher begins with a general cause 
effect relationship that he or she logically derives from a possible causal 
law in general theory. He or she logically links the abstract ideas of the 
relationship to precise measurements of the social world. 
It is, however, important that the researcher remains detached, neutral and 
objective as he or she measures aspects of social life, examines evidence and 
replicates the research of others. These processes lead to an empirical test of, 
and confirmation for, the laws of social life as outlined in the theory. This 
theory will not be used for this research because of its inclination to natural 
sciences. This research is about humans relating to their institutions of 
governance and requires an approach focused on human relations and not 
natural sciences. 
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3.2.2 Interactive Social Science 
This theory can be traced to German sociologist, Max Weber (1864-1920), 
and German philosopher Wilhem Dilthey (1833-1911). Interpretative 
researchers often use participant observation and field research. Neuman 
(1997:68) views the interpretive approach 
as a systematic analysis of socially meaning action through the direct 
detailed observations of the people in natural settings in order to arrive at 
understandings and interpretations of how people create and maintain their 
social worlds. 
He argues that for interpretive researchers, the goal of social research is to 
develop an understanding of social life and discover how people construct 
meaning in natural settings. An interpretive researcher wants to learn what is 
meaningful or relevant to the people being studied, or how individuals 
experience daily life. These researchers study meaningful social action, not 
just external or observable behaviour of people. 
According to Nueman (1997:68) 
For action to be regarded as social and to be of interest to the social 
scientist, the actor must attach subjective meaning to it and must be 
directed towards the activities of other people. 
To that end, the interpretive approach holds a view that social life is based on 
social interactions and socially designed meaning systems. Access to other 
human beings is viewed as possible, however, only by direct means: ―what we 
experience initially are gestures, sound and action and only in the process of 
understanding do we take the step from external signs to the underlying inner 
life‖. 
Interactive social scientists argue that ordinary people are engaged in a 
process of creating workable systems of meanings through social interaction. 
The researchers in his category want to discover what actions mean to the 
people who engage in them. It argues that common sense is a vital source of 
information for understanding people. Neuman (1997:71) argues that, 
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Interpretive analysis of a social setting, like the interpretations of a literal 
work, has internal coherence and is routed in the text, which here refers to 
meaningful everyday experiences of the people being studied. 
Interpretative researchers rarely ask objective survey questions, aggregate 
the answers of many people, and claim to have something meaningful. 
The interpretation of the survey should be located in a context, e.g., the 
individual‘s past experiences or the survey interview situation and the meaning 
of a view or a questioning context. Most importantly, because each person 
assigns a somewhat a different meaning to the question and answer, 
combining answers only produces nonsense. Cuba & Lincoln (1994:115) 
argue that: 
The interpretive researcher argues that researchers should reflect on, re-
examine and analyse personal points of and feelings as a part of process of 
studying others. The interpretive researcher urges making values explicit 
and does not assume that any one set of values is better or worse. The 
researcher‘s proper role is to be a passionate participant, involved with 
those being studied. 
While this theory does not form the basis for this research methodology, it 
will nonetheless inform a lot of ideas in the research as it is also focused on 
people interactive relations.  
3.2.3 Critical Social Science 
This approach has been defined as a critical process of enquiry that goes 
beyond surface illusions to uncover the real structures in the material world in 
order to help people change conditions and build a better world for 
themselves. 
Critical researchers conduct research to critique and transform social 
relations. They do this by revealing the underlying sources of social relations 
and empowering people, especially less powerful people. The purpose of CSS 
is to transform the world. Stated in clear terms, it uncovers myths, reveals 
hidden truths and develops means and ways of making sure people change 
the world for themselves. Fay (1987:27) states that the purpose of critical 
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social theory is ―to explain a social order in such a way that it becomes itself 
the catalyst which leads to the transformation of this social order‖. This view is 
shared by Neuman (1997; 87) who argues that while positivist researcher tries 
to solve problems as they are defined by government or corporate elites, 
without ―rocking the boat‖, by contrast, the critical researcher may create 
problems by ―intentionally raising and identifying more problems than ruling 
elites in the politics and administration are to accommodate, much less to 
solve.‖ 
The ultimate goal of critical research is to empower people and their 
communities. This is the strongest reason for choosing it to be the research 
theory which informs this study. This study is basically about means and ways 
of democratising public spheres to allow for active citizens‘ participation in 
decisions that affect their lives, which is exactly what critical social theory 
aspires. This position is well articulated by Kincheloe & McLaren (1994:40) in 
their argument that, 
Critical research can be best understood in the context of the 
empowerment of individuals. Inquiry that aspires to the name critical must 
be connected to attempt to confront the injustice of a particular society or 
sphere within the society. Research thus becomes the transformative 
endeavour. Unembarrassed by the label ―political‖ and unafraid to 
consummate a relationship with an emancipator consciousness the critical 
researcher studies the past or different societies in order to better see 
change or to discover alternative ways to organise social life. 
The African Union, just like the CSS, is interested in the development of new 
social relations, the evolution of social institutions or societies and the causes 
of major social change. CSS, just like the AU, focuses on change and conflict, 
especially paradoxes or conflicts that are inherent in the way social relations 
are organised. Given the world of similarities in approach to the realities of life 
of CSS and deliberative democracy, it has been chosen as the theoretical 
basis of the methodology that is used in this study. 
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Table 3.1: A Summary of Differences among the three approaches to 
research 
 POSITIVISM INTERPRETIVE 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 
CRITICAL 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 
Reason for 
research 
To discover natural laws 
so people can predict 
and control events  
To understand and 
describe meaningful 
social action 
To smash myths and 
empower people to 
change society 
radically 
Nature of social 
reality 
Stable pre-existing 
patterns or order that 
can be discovered  
Fluid definitions of a 
situation created by 
human inter-action  
Conflict filled and 
governed by hidden 
underlying structures 
Nature of human 
beings  
Self-interested and 
rational individuals who 
are shaped by external 
forces 
Social beings who 
create meaning and 
who constantly make 
sense of their worlds 
Creative, adaptive 
people with 
unrealised potential, 
trapped by illusion 
and explanation 
Role of common 
sense 
Clearly distinct from and 
less valid than science 
Powerful everyday 
theories used by 
ordinary people 
False beliefs that 
hide power and 
objective conditions 
Theory looks like A logical, deductive 
system of 
interconnected 
definitions, axioms, and 
laws 
A description of how a 
group‘s meaning 
system is generated 
and sustained  
A critique that 
reveals true 
conditions and helps 
people see the way 
to better world  
An explanation 
that is true 
Is logically connected to 
laws and based on facts  
Resonates or feels right 
to those who are being 
studied  
Supplies people with 
tools needed to 
change the world  
Good evidence Is based on precise 
observations that others 
can repeat  
Is embedded in the 
context of fluid social 
interactions 
Is informed by a 
theory that unveils 
illusions  
Place of values Science is value free, 
and values have no 
place except when 
choosing a topic  
Values are an integral 
part of social life: no 
group‘s values are 
wrong, only different 
All science must 
begin with a value 
position; some 
positions are right, 
some are wrong 
Adapted from Lawrence Neuman, (1987, p83) 
 39 
3.3 Data collection techniques  
The research was conducted using the qualitative research method. The 
method places lots of emphasis on the social context in order to understand 
the social world. There is a great emphasis on the belief that the meaning or 
statement depends, in an important way, on the context in which it appears. 
Qualitative research starts with a research question and assumes that there is 
no single view of reality but that different methods reveal different 
perspectives. The qualitative style focuses on the construction of social reality 
and cultural meaning .It differs from quantitative research, which measures 
objective facts. In qualitative research, the following are viewed as key 
elements;  
 Focuses on interactive processes, events 
 Authenticity is key 
 It has inherent values that are explicit 
 It is situationally strained 
 It focuses on thematic analysis 
 There are few case studies 
 The researcher is personally involved 
In order to understand qualitative research well, it is important to start by 
comparing it with quantitative research. In that way, striking differences will 
emerge and these bring out the main reasons on why it is the preferred 
research method for this study. Table 3.2 below summarises the main 
differences between qualitative and quantitative research. This research uses 
a qualitative approach because it is exploring a question for which there is no 
answer. The answers to the questions posed are highly dependent on a 
detailed description of the institutional and regulatory contexts of Zimbabwe 
and the AU. In addition, the strategies posed reflect the world view and 
understandings of the CSOs interviewed and cannot be generalised.  
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Table 3.2: Differences between Qualitative and Quantitative Research 
Quantitative  Qualitative 
Test hypothesis that the research 
begins with. 
Captures and discovers the meaning once the 
researcher becomes immersed in the data. 
Concepts are in the form of distinct 
variables 
Concepts are in the form of themes, motifs, 
generalisation, and taxonomies. 
Measures are symmetrically created 
before data collection and are 
standardised. 
Measures are created in ad hoc manner and are 
often specific to the individual setting or 
researcher. 
Data are in the form of numbers from 
precise measurement 
Data are in the form of words from documents, 
observations, and transcript. 
Theory is largely causal and deductive Theory can be causal and non causal and is often 
inductive. 
Procedures are started and replication 
assumed 
Research procedures are particular, and 
replication is very rare. 
Analysis proceeds by using statistics, 
tables, or charts and discussing how 
what they show relates to the 
hypotheses 
Analysis proceeds by extracting themes or 
generalisations from evidence and organising 
data to present a coherent, consistent picture. 
 
3.4 Data Collection Methods 
The data collection method used in this research was a combination of 
document review and structured interviews. These documents include the AU 
founding statues, the ECOSOCC founding statutes, The NEPAD, PAP and 
APRM statutes. These are attached as appendix 3. Document analysis of 
these was important in that it provided a clear picture on the current 
operations of these organisations  
The researcher used convenient purposeful sampling and manipulated no 
situation or condition but just allowed people to answer in the manner that they 
wanted. The research questions were structured and semi-structured. There 
are basically four commonly used interview methods. These are; mail and self-
administered questionnaires, telephone surveys and e-mail surveys. The 
preferred one for this study is the self-administered questionnaire due to the 
advantages that will be articulated later on. 
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3.4.1 Face-to-face Interviews 
The preferred choice of interviewing was the face-to-face interview. According 
to Neuman (1997), face-to-face interviews have the highest response rates 
and permit longest questions. They have the advantages over telephone 
interviews, as interviewers also can observe the surroundings and use non-
verbal communication and visual aids. 
It has, however, the disadvantage of high cost as the training, travel and 
subsistence can be high. There is also a high degree of bias as the 
appearance or the tone of the voice and questioning can affect the 
respondent. Despite the stated problems, the face-to-face interview remains 
the preferred choice because the researcher wanted to capitalise on a big 
return rate which can give reliable results. As such the data was done through 
face to face interviews with selected senior leadership of selected 
organisations 
3.4.2 Interviewing 
An interview differs from an ordinary conversation. An interview has been 
described by Neuman (1996:305) as, 
a short term, secondary interaction between two strangers with the explicit 
purpose of one person obtaining specific information form the other and a 
conversation is an ordinary informal verbal exchange. 
3.4.3 The questionnaire 
The major instrument for collecting data in this research was a questionnaire. 
The questionnaire is attached as appendix 1. A questionnaire is a data-
collecting instrument used at an interview or given to respondents to fill in on 
their own in their own time. It solicits appropriate information from the 
respondents for data analysis.  
The information is needed in order to draw conclusions from the findings of the 
research. The questionnaire is generally considered to be a simple method of 
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collecting data. The researcher comes up with questions which are clear so 
that they are easily answered by the respondents. Lengthy questions are 
avoided as they may have an effect of boring the respondent. The 
questionnaire consists of semi-structured and structured questions. In the 
policy research of this nature, opinions and perceptions matter, hence the 
need to use both structured and semi-structured questions. 
A good questionnaire forms a good basis for any research. The researcher 
weaves questions together so they flow smoothly. He or she includes 
introductory remarks and instructions for clarification and measures each 
variable with one or more survey questions. In the construction of the 
questionnaire, the following important principles of a good questionnaire were 
taken into serious consideration. The principles were adapted with 
modifications from Neuman (1997): 
 Avoidance of confusion and keeping of the respondent‘s perspective in 
mind 
 Good survey questions both give the researcher valid and reliable 
measures and help respondents feel they understand the question and that 
their answers are meaningful 
 Avoidance of jargon and slang: jargon and technical terms come in 
many forms, e.g. plumbers talk about snakes, lawyers about contract of 
uberima fides, psychologists about oedipus complex.  
 Avoidance of ambiguity, confusion and vagueness: a researcher might 
make implicit assumptions without thinking of respondents, e.g. the 
question: ―What is your income?‖ could mean weekly, monthly, annually 
etc. Double-barrelled questions can also be a source of ambiguity, e.g. ―Do 
you jog regularly?‖ Yes/No hinges on the meaning of the word ―regularly‖. 
Some respondents may define ―regularly‖ as everyday, others weekly.  
 Avoidance of emotional language and prestige bias: Words have 
implicit connotative as well as explicit denotative meanings. Likewise, titles 
or positions in society, e.g. president, carry prestige or status. Words with 
strong emotional connotations and stand on issues linked to people with 
high social status can colour how respondents hear and answer survey 
questions. As such, use neutral language and also avoid prestige bias. 
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 Avoidance of double-barrelled questions: Make each question about 
one and only topic. A double-barrelled question consists of two or more 
questions joined together and, as such, makes the respondents‘ answer 
ambiguous. 
 Avoidance of leading questions: It is important make respondents feel 
that all responses are legitimate. A leading or loaded question is one that 
leads the respondent to choose one response over another by its wording. 
 Avoidance of questions that are beyond the respondent’s 
capabilities: Asking something that a few respondents know frustrates 
and produces poor quality responses. Respondents cannot always recall 
past details and may not know specific factual information. 
 Avoidance of false promises; It is important not begin a question with a 
promise with which respondents may not agree, and then ask about choice 
regarding it. 
 Avoidance of asking about distant future intentions  
 Avoidance of asking people how they might do under hypothetical 
circumstances  
 Avoidance of double negatives: Double negatives in ordinary language 
are grammatically incorrect and confusing e.g. ―I ain‘t got a job‖ logically 
means the respondent does have a job. 
 Avoidance of overlapping or unbalanced response categories; It is 
important that the response categories or choices mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. 
 
The research, as already stated was done using a questionnaire in which the 
researcher interviewed the selected leaders of the CSOs. The idea of going 
out to physically interview these leaders is because the questionnaires sent 
out have a very low return rate. Face to face enquires also provide for probing 
and as such it allowed me to get information that I would not have managed to 
get if I had sent out the questionnaires.  
Of the twenty organisations that were interviewed fifteen were based in Harare 
the capital city while five were in Bulawayo the second largest city. The reason 
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why the majority of interviews were in Harare is because the management of 
most of these organisations are in the capital where the headquarters are. 
 The interviews in Harare were conducted between February and April 2009 
while those in Bulawayo were done in May 2009. The organisations that were 
interviewed in Harare are Zimbabwe Election Support Network 
(ZESN),Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), National Constitutional 
Assembly (NCA) ,Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition ,Zimbabwe Civic Education 
Trust (ZIMCET),Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), .Zimbabwe 
Human Rights Trust ,Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association (ZWLA), 
Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU),Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt 
and Development, Christian Alliance ,Catholic Commission for Justice and 
Peace .(CCJP)Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) and Women 
of Zimbabwe Arise. The interviews were done with senior management of 
these organisations.  
Those interviewed in Bulawayo are Bulawayo Dialogue Institute, NTCHA, 
Habakkuk Trust, Uluntu Platform and Legal Resources Foundation. 
During the face to face  interview process responses were entered into the 
questionnaire using and when all the twenty organisations had been 
interviewed, the data was cleaned and each questionnaire given a unique 
code which for the purpose of data processing. At the end of the coding data 
was entered into an MS Excel spreadsheet for processing and analysis .The 
excel programme gave out the results that were analysed by the researcher  
in line with the research questions and these are well presented in chapter 5.  
In choosing the instruments for this research, issues concerning validity, 
reliability, appropriateness, flexibility, cost effectiveness, time restraints, as 
well as the researcher‘s ability were also taken into serious consideration. 
These issues are well explained below. 
3.5 Validity 
The issue of validity concerns itself with the ability of the research instrument 
to provide data that measures what the researcher intends to measure and 
provide a valid answer. It is effective if the responses obtained furnish the 
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researcher with the required data which can be easily analysed. Sax 
(1989:292) defines validity as, ―the extent to which measurements are useful 
in making the decisions relevant to a given purpose‖. The measurements in 
the research process are questions in the questionnaire. The information 
obtained from the research questions enables the researcher to come up with 
some meaningful decisions on the study.  
 Wording of questions. Is the wording of questions clear to the 
respondents and do all the respondents derive the same meaning from 
the questions? 
 Construction of sentences. Are the sentences appropriate? Are they 
too short or too long? Do they give unnecessary detail that confuse the 
respondents? 
 Difficult questions. Are there questions which respondents find difficult 
to answer? 
 Refusal rate. Is there a tendency for respondents to refuse to answer 
particular questions? 
 Time requirement. What is the approximate time needed to answer the 
questionnaire? Do the respondents seem to tire at the end? 
 Coding. Are there problems with coding that data? 
 Usefulness of the data. Is the questionnaire able to generate the type of 
information that is expected of it? 
It is after analysing the results from the questionnaires of the pilot test that 
new questions will be developed. Some questions will be modified while 
others will be retained unchanged. The responses obtained from the  test will 
then be used to modify questions to the appropriate level of the participants‘ 
comprehension.  
 It is important to have questions that match the participants‘ level of 
understanding. Questions which prove to be too difficult may lead to the 
respondents abandoning the questionnaire and too simple ones may offend 
the respondents when they regard the questions as under-rating their 
intelligence. 
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3.6 Reliability 
The accuracy of the research instrument is how reliable it is for the study. Sax 
(1989:259) has defined reliability as, ―the extent to which measurement can be 
depended upon to provide consistent and unambiguous information. It can be 
considered as the extent to which if the same research is carried out in the 
same manner, everything being equal will yield the same results. The 
reliability of a research instrument in social studies research is affected by 
various factors. For example if the same question is asked under different 
circumstances and condition it must give the same answer. To improve the 
reliability of the questions, the researcher structured the questions so that the 
wording of the questions remained the same at any given time. The pilot test 
enabled that vague questions were identified and modified as they would have 
given unwanted responses that have nothing to do with the research objective. 
In this study the test of validity is shown through use of questions that will give 
the same desired results in different settings.  
The issue of participation, or lack of participation, of civil society in policy-
making is not peculiar to Zimbabwe, it is a problem in a number of other 
African countries. The instruments used in this research do pass the test of 
validity in that they can provide similar results for a research of a similar topic 
even if it were to be carried out in a different African country. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter explicitly gave a description of the research methodology used in 
this research. It touches on the strengths of methodology, including the 
advantages of the research instruments. The chapter thus gives a good 
background on what to expect in the in the following chapters that deal with 
research findings as well as conclusions. 
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Chapter Four: Institutional Framework for CSOs 
Participation in the AU 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter looks at the institutional framework of the African Union and how 
each of its organs can provide the necessary spaces for participation by the 
Zimbabwean CSOs .The chapter will give an in-depth presentation of all the 
key organs of the AU with a view of giving a clear outline of how it can provide 
the spaces for interactive governance. 
The primary reason for deliberative democracy and popular inclusion in policy-
making is really around democratisation of public spheres. The AU is a 
continental public body in which African citizens should be encouraged to 
participate in its policy formulation. 
4.2 The AU decision-making architecture 
According to Landsberg and Mckay (2005),the AU decision making 
architecture includes: 
 The Assembly of Head of States and Government which is the highest 
decision-making body and it meets at least twice a year.  
 The Executive Council of Ministers which advises the Heads of State and 
Government and co-ordinates and takes decisions on policy. 
 The Permanent Representatives Council (PRC) comprising 
representatives of member states, which prepares the work for the 
Executive Council, acting on instructions of the Executive Council of 
Ministers. 
In this structure, Zimbabwean civil society can engage and try to influence 
policy by lobbying, for instance, the Executive Council of Ministers or the PRC, 
or even the Heads of State. These are the most powerful organs in policy-
initiation and if Zimbabwean civil society gets sympathisers in these, then it 
can influence policies that can be favourable for its citizens. 
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It is my proposal that Zimbabwean CSOs can also lobby through another 
important and influential organ of the AU Commission . The Commission 
serves as the secretariat of the AU and it comprises the Chairperson, his 
deputy and ten Commissioners. The Commission is designed to represent the 
union and also defend its interests. Landsberg and Mckay (2005) argue that 
the Commission serves under the instructions of the Heads of State and the 
Government, but also has a clear policy-making and advisory function. He 
further argues that under the leadership of President Alpha Konare, the 
Commission proved to be a key policy-making and served to effectively guide 
the Assembly and Executive Council. The office of the Chairperson is 
structured around a very powerful cabinet which, in itself is a key policy-
making structure. Given the power of the Commission, Zimbabwean civil 
society can try to influence the African Union Policy direction by engaging 
directly at the level of the Commission. 
4.3 The Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
This is a 15-member council responsible for promoting peace and security. It 
was established in December 2003 and its statutes provide for citizens to 
bring matters to its attention. According to the World Vision Report (2007), the 
PSC is currently establishing three sub-organs namely 
 The Panel of Wise to be made up of five prominent Africans whose role 
will be to engage in preventative diplomacy and mediation. 
 Continental Early Warning System designed to enhance the PSC‘s 
conflict prevention effectiveness through provision of information 
timorously.  
 The African Standby Force, effectively on-standby army for peace-
keeping and peace enforcement made up of troops from AU member 
states and organised at sub-regional level. 
This is yet another AU organ in which Zimbabwean civil society can influence 
policy direction. It should, however, be noted that for Zimbabwean civil society 
strategies to be effective, there must be no disconnection between the lobby 
 50 
at continental level and regional level. To that end, it will be important to 
engage vigorously at the level of the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC). The simple reason being the AU takes seriously policy decision 
forwarded by Regional Economic Blocs . According to the World Vision Report 
(2007) 
Under the AU, strenuous efforts are underway to bring the RECs more fully 
into the continental fold, and a new AU protocol has been established and 
negotiated to this end, the recognition that the RECs have more to show in 
terms of tangible progress towards integration than the AU itself. So at the 
AU level therefore, anybody who wants to engage with Africa needs to have 
a sense of what is happening to the RECs. 
It is thus crucial for Zimbabwean CSOs to initiate their lobby at the SADC 
level. 
4.4 The SADC Architecture  
Landsberg and Mckay (2005) argue that highest decision making body is the 
summit of Heads of State or Government of all member state .They further 
argue that   
The summit is the ultimate policy making institution of SADC, and is 
responsible for the overall policy direction and control functions of the 
organisation, the summit usually meets once a year and then there is the 
Troika; consisting of the chair, incoming chair and outgoing chair of the 
SADC. This instrument has enabled that decisions be made quickly and it 
provides policy direction. 
There is also the Council of Ministers of each member state, usually from 
Ministries of Foreign Affair or Finance. This organ oversees that policies are 
implemented properly. This is another body that CSOs can lobby as the 
policies are formulated at continental level. 
The SADC National Committee is a body comprising key stakeholders. 
According to Landsberg and Mckay (2005,14) 
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It comprises of sic government, private sector and civil society in member 
states and is mandated to provide inputs at the national level in the 
formulation of regional policies, strategies, SADC Plan of Action (SPA) as 
well as co-ordinate and oversee the implementation of these programmes 
at the national level.‖ 
Given the importance of this organ in formulation of SADC policies, the 
Zimbabwean CSOs can target it as an entry point of influencing regional policy 
initiatives and ultimately the AU policy initiatives. 
4.5 The AU Civil Society Organisations Forum 
The African Forum and Network on Debt and Recovery (AFRODAT) AU report 
(2006) indicates that  
The AU Civil Society Organisations Forum, an event organised by the 
CIDO ahead of the AU summits, is an opportunity to brief CSOs on 
relevant developments within the AU. It also has the potential to be an 
opportunity for civil society organisations to inform AU policy by 
submitting recommendation to the summit: These AU CSOs forum are an 
indication of the openness to civil society engagement and the 
Zimbabwean civil society have to grab all the available opportunities to 
participate in these.  
The Zimbabwean civil society would have to be properly co-ordinated to have 
effective policy inputs at that level. It requires consensus on certain policy 
issues so that they are easily defendable at that level. It must not be a victim 
of what the World Vision Reports (2007,54) calls ―one concern was that the 
AU-Civil Society Pre-summit forum was ‗packed with some of the usual 
suspect‘, implying that participation was carefully selected to exclude those 
likely to be critical‖. Mutasa and Houghton (2006) argue that the summit 
constitutes work in progress in influencing policy outcomes of the AU. This 
space will become more relevant as Zimbabwean CSOs organise themselves 
in such a way as to maximise the opportunities provided.  
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4.6 AU institutions providing opportunities for policy 
engagement 
There a number of African Union policy organs that provides opportunities for 
participation of Zimbabwean civil society in the policy-making initiatives of the 
continental body. This study would restrict itself to the following key policy 
organs: 
 The ECOSOCC 
 The PAP 
 The APRM 
 The NEPAD 
 The Commission 
 The PSC 
4.6.1 ECOSOCC 
In its Founding statutes Article 3 of the AU Constitutive Act ,the AU makes a 
strong commitment to promotion of democratic principles and institutions for 
democratic popular participation and good governance .It is therefore a fact 
that the AU, in its common vision of a strong Africa, requires the building of 
partnerships between the government and all segments of civil society, in 
particular women, youth and the private sector. It shouts for the strengthening 
of solidarity among its people, hence the creation of ECOSOCC as the 
principal formal channel through which the voice of the civil society 
organisations can be heard in the policy-making of the AU. According to 
Landsberg and Mckay (2005,30) 
ECOSOCC is designed to provide a mechanism for interface between AU 
and African civil society. It is to be based on consultation, collaboration and 
partnership between governments and civil society in Africa. 
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This organ has a key function of advising and providing a channel so that the 
African people can contribute to policy formulation of the continental body. 
According to the founding statutes, its objectives are as follows: 
 The promotion of permanent dialogue between the African people and their 
leadership on vital issues concerning Africa and its future. 
 Promoting strong partnerships between governments and all segments of 
civil society in particular women, youths, children, the Diaspora and private 
sector. 
 Supporting the political and socio-economic development of the continent.  
 Promoting democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, 
good governance, human rights and freedoms and social justice. 
 Collaborating with and strengthening linkages with other organs of the 
Union and with the regional economic blocs. 
An unpublished ECOSOCC (2006), report indicates that a Zimbabwean 
chapter of ECOSSOC was established in November 2006  According to the 
report of the Zimbabwean Chapter (2006), clusters were created in line with 
Zimbabwe development priorities. A number of sectoral committees were 
established to deal with key operational issues and further provide inputs to 
the policies and mechanisms of the African Union. The committees were 
proposed in the following areas: 
 Rural Economy and Agriculture 
 Infrastructure and Energy 
 Economic Affairs  
 Trade and Industry 
 Human Resources, Science and Technology 
 Public Affairs 
 Women and Gender 
CSOs in Zimbabwe were encouraged to make policy contributions to the 
stated thematic areas for onward transmission to the policy-making organs of 
the AU. This presents lots of shortcomings as ECOSOCC is only established 
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as an advisory body. The fact is, even if Zimbabwean CSOs make their own 
input on policy proposals in the stated thematic areas to the Zimbabwean 
chapter of ECOSOCC, this chapter can work only as an advisory council 
which works against its strength. According to Moyo (2006), Article 22 of the 
Constitutive Act reveals prospects and limitations associated with 
ECOSOCC‘s advisory function. Article 22 of the AU Constitutive Act reveals 
prospects and limitations associated with ECOSOCC‘s advisory function. This 
raises concerns as to whether the organ has the ability to influence policies 
within the AU .The figure below outlines the roles and functions of ECOSOCC 
  
 
Figure 4.1: Key Roles of the Economic Social and Cultural Council 
(Adapted from AU Commission 2006) 
 
The glaring reality is that in the power matrix or the decision-making 
architecture of the AU, ECOSOCC has limited influence. In terms of 
composition and hierarchy of the AU, at the top is the Assembly of Heads of 
States and the government which meets twice a year. The first summit in 
January usually attends to policy and strategic planning while the second one 
focuses on budget and operational matters . This organ is followed by the 
Executive Council of Ministers (ECM) which advises the Assembly and takes 
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decisions on policy issues. After that, there is the Permanent Representative 
Council (PRC) comprising permanent representatives of member states. 
Alongside the ECM is the Commission, which serves as the Secretariat under 
the General Assembly. The Commission in the past has guided the Assembly 
and ECM. Below the Commission sits the office of the Chairperson, which is 
structured around a powerful cabinet-like structure. This organ is very powerful 
in policy-making.  
There are other important and powerful influential bodies within the AU 
architecture and they include the Peace and Security Council, comprising 15 
member states responsible for peace and security on the continent and then 
NEPAD and the implementation committee of Heads of States and 
Government. The above mentioned structures are all good entry points for 
Zimbabwean civil society. Zimbabwean CSOs must not limit their engagement 
only to ECOSOCC and the highest decision-making of AU. It is important to 
engage right from the bottom, especially knowing that there are serious 
challenges facing ECOSOCC.  
While it is a fact that the ECOSOCC is a platform for civil society to engage 
and ensure popular participation and people-centred governance, enabling 
African people and institutions to not only contribute to the programmes and 
decisions of the AU, but to assume ownership of these programmes and be 
responsible for their implementation. Moyo (2006) indicates that the 
challenges facing ECOSOCC as stipulated in article 6 of its founding statutes 
(2006) regarding the code of ethics and conduct, the election process as well 
as the selection criteria for civil society organisations that will eventually 
constitute the General Assembly, seem to cripple the organ. Despite these 
challenges, the strength of ECOSOCC lies at the cluster communities where 
in-depth input can be made by civil society based on their expertise. It is 
important that in the Zimbabwean context, while ECOSOCC does provide a 
basis for CSOs engagement with the AU policy crafting organs, there are a 
number of improvements that have to be done before it can be used as a best 
practice. Some of these institutional challenges include: 
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 A weak financial base and institutional structure due to its reliance on 
African Citizen Directorate for funding, advice and administrative support. 
too much 
 An unclear and flawed process of composition of the national chapter 
which excludes many CSOs in the country as a result weakening the 
scope of participation. 
 There is limited national consultation and knowledge amongst the citizens, 
even the CSOs in Zimbabwe, on the existence and functions of 
ECOSOCC. 
 The legal framework as initially stated, of establishing ECOSOCC only as 
an organ with advisory powers, without its own treaty significantly weakens 
its position. 
In Zimbabwe, just like many of the African countries, ECOSOCC is not a truly 
representative body as it leaves out a number of organisations outside the 
programmes. The African Union Report (2007,7) states that: 
If ECOSOCC is to play the role intended for it, it must become a much 
more genuinely representative body, this will require both significant 
strengthening of the process of electing representatives to its structures 
and a stronger position for ECOSOCC itself within the AU organs. 
4.6.2 New Partnership for Africa‘s Development (NEPAD) 
Moyo (2006) indicates that the other organ of the African Union in which 
spaces exist for civil society participation is the NEPAD .He argues that  the 
African leaders, in search of a continental economic growth agenda, 
established NEPAD based on principles of a common vision and participatory 
democracy . According to Landsberg and Mckay (2005) NEPAD sees a 
dialectical relationship between politics and economics, and makes an explicit 
link between development, peace, good governance and democracy. He 
further argues that the agenda of NEPAD is to inculcate into African politics a 
culture of democracy, accountability and good governance. Indeed, NEPAD is 
based on what Landsberg and Mckay (2005,12) describes as a trade off: ―in 
exchange for African leaders holding each other accountable, industrialised 
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powers of the world would commit themselves to African development‖. The 
basis for the establishment of NEPAD was to create an umbilical link between 
development and stability. It points out at what Landsberg and Mckay (2005) 
call three pre-requisites for social and economic regeneration, poverty 
alleviation and empowerment: Peace and security  
1. Democracy and political governance; and 
2. Economic and corporate governance. 
NEPAD framework for development does not only stop at the above but goes 
on to advocate establishment and protection of an apolitical order and 
systems of governance that are legitimate and enjoy the support and loyalty of 
the African people ; 
 strong enough to advocate the interests of African people; and  
 able to engage effectively with various global processes that characterise 
the world economy 
Zimbabwean civil society have, on a number of occasions, made attempts to 
involve themselves in the NEPAD programmes, particularly through 
discussions in the NEPAD business forum. World Vision Report (2007) 
NEPAD has however suffered in the public eye because it has been criticised 
as a top-down elitist programme driven by African leaders with very little 
consultation with civil society organisations . The problem has been the clash 
of the ownership of the whole initiative. Cilliers and Sturman (2004, in Moyo 
(2006) argue that a closer look at the NEPAD document exposes two critical 
and seminal aspects of the NEPAD agenda, namely, NEPAD as a ―pledge by 
African leaders‖ to place their countries on the path of sustainable growth and 
development and NEPAD as an ―appeal to African peoples to support the 
implementation of this initiative by setting up structures for organisation, 
mobilisation and action‖. This boils down to a conflict in that, on one hand, are 
the African leaders who believe that by virtue of a popular mandate from 
elections, they should own the initiative, while on the other hand, civil society 
organisations felt they should have been consulted and participated in the 
drafting of the economic plan for Africa. 
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A study by Kotze and Steyn (2003) indicates sharp ideological differences 
between non-state actors and states regarding the development of the 
NEPAD. The outcome of this study shows that some African civil society 
groupings are opposed to what they call invitation of neo-global organisations 
to cure Africa‘s ills. These neo-liberal institutions include the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation, 
among others. There are many organisations in Zimbabwe who view NEPAD 
as an elitist move. Moyo (2006:10) argues that: 
There is a view that exclusion of civil society in drafting and implementation 
of NEPAD resulted in criticism being levelled at the policy itself. The 
exclusion of civil society in the initiation of NEPAD deprived many CSOs 
players of important knowledge on how to effectively contribute to the 
economic plan for Africa.  
Participation of all stakeholders has been seen as key to positive 
developmental initiatives in NEPAD. Wameyo (2003), on the role of civil 
society within the context of NEPAD, argues that there are at least three 
interpretations of the role of civil society: 
1. They can be recipients or beneficiaries of state benevolence in which they 
become end-users of state-provided poverty eradication initiatives, with 
little interests or capacity for contributing to policy deliberations which is 
better left to experts.  
2. They can assume a watchdog role to ensure that state-initiated 
programmes succeed. On this one, civil society would be consulted on how 
programmes are implemented and how further to improve delivery and 
efficiency. Recent studies have shown civil society as a channel through 
which programmes are implemented on how to improve delivery and 
efficiency. This situation has presented problems particularly within 
Zimbabwe in that the CSOs have not become partners in the real sense as 
the government has continued to have heavy control of these. 
3. They have to be integral players in economic and social development, 
participating in defining the direction of Africa‘s growth. To that end, civil 
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society thus participates in governance as well as development initiatives, 
including the direction of development programmes 
NEPAD has been viewed as a practicable and avenue for economic growth 
but it needs to be more accommodative to non-state actors. For instance, 
Wameyo (2003), on the role of civil society in NEPAD, states that it is an 
integral player in the economic and social development, participating in 
defining Africa‘s direction as a right and not privilege. He however, raises a 
question and defines NEPAD as an initiative that selectively provides space 
for private sector and donors rather than addressing the issue of development 
in Africa.  
Wameyo ( 2003) ,then makes the following suggestions: 
 African leaders should acknowledge that NEPAD ignores the role played 
by civil society in development. 
 There must be a deliberate ―opening‖ up of NEPAD to consultations with 
civil society organisations, as well as the development of mechanisms with 
the secretariat to deal with and respond to concerns of civil society 
organisations. 
 A timetable should be drawn to revamp NEPAD, taking into consideration 
the concerns raised by civil society organisations and contributions already 
made to the NEPAD debate; and 
 A process of national dissemination of NEPAD, which seeks to relate to 
NEPAD initiatives to in-country process for collective poverty-eradication 
should be embarked on. 
A lot of pressure by continental civil society bodies on the need to involve civil 
society players in the NEPAD initiatives has seen the establishment of a civil 
society desk. Moyo (2006,11) , indicates that: 
NEPAD continues to interact with civil society groups at various levels. On 
a generic level, a civil society desk has been established at NEPAD 
secretariat with a view to having one stop focal point for civil society. At a 
sector level, all programmes are being implemented in consultation with 
relevant civil society groups. However, it must be noted the level and extent 
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of civil society participation in the implementation of NEPAD programmes is 
largely dependent on the capacity of civil society groups. 
It is however unfortunate that despite the creation of this desk, Zimbabwean 
civil society effectively remains unrepresented. For instance, there are these 
limitations: 
 Limited information flow between Zimbabwean civil society and the NEPAD 
civil society desk 
 Limited, if any, involvement of Zimbabwean civil society in the programmes 
formulation 
 Little interaction between the NEPAD and Zimbabwean civil society 
organisations. 
This has the effect of limiting the strength of NEPAD. Moyo (2006) argues that 
―If the status quo continuous, civil society might be perceived as rubber 
stamps of NEPAD‖. This raises the question of seriousness of Zimbabwean 
civil society engagement in the policy input of NEPAD.  
 According to the World Vision Report (2007), the NEPAD secretariat has set 
up a unit to put in place and ensure implementation of the NEPAD civil society 
policies and also to mainstream civil society involvement in the NEPAD 
processes and share the best practices. According to the same document, 
NEPAD CSO Think Tank has been created with the following terms of 
reference: 
 Mobilise and ensure effective participation of CSOs in NEPAD initiatives 
and regional, sub-regional and national levels; 
 Create a conducive environment at the REC level for CSO involvement, 
co-ordination, capacity-building and participation in NEPAD and REC 
issues; 
 Determining CSOs‘ various niches, identify their roles in different NEPAD 
processes, including the regional economic regimes; 
 Work complementarily with CSOs implementing programmes around 
NEPAD sectors and win their support in order to use their networking 
capabilities to implement and advocate NEPAD at the grassroots level; 
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 Ensure all CSO Think Tank are gender mainstreamed to meet AU gender 
party principle; 
 Better understand CSOs and enhance their capacity to support and 
participate in NEPAD implementation; 
 Strengthen CSOs‘ understanding of integration at regional and different 
sub-regional levels, within the context of ECOSOCC ; 
 Popularise NEPAD and improve relations between CSOs, governments 
and the private sector; 
 Build the capacity of CSOs to effectively participate in the implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of NEPAD; 
 Process and step down knowledge on new ideas rolling out of the NEPAD 
secretariat action plans; such as APRMs to national level 
 Develop a framework that can identify best practices from CSOs that can 
be up-scaled and replicated by NEPAD 
There is a need for Zimbabwean civil society to promote genuine engagement 
with NEPAD structures. Part of this would entail effective utilisation of spaces 
provided at the national chapters of NEPAD. It should also be noted that the 
bad blood between Zimbabwean civil society and the government limits the 
spaces for civil society participation in inter-state programmes like NEPAD. 
Relations thus have to improve in line with the resolution of the NEPAD civil 
society forum on building stronger partnerships. The African Union Status 
report indicates that this meeting held in Accra on 25-28 March 2003 
recommended that civil society groupings should improve relations with 
government. If it is not achieved, then Zimbabwean civil society will continue 
to lag behind in influencing the formulation of policies at the continental level. 
4.6.3 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 
According to the World Vision Report (2007),the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM) is an important project of the NEPAD . It is designed to 
promote meaningful interaction between government and citizens on issues of 
democracy, human rights, poverty and service delivery. The APRM is 
modelled around the principles of the APRM (NEPAD APRM/Panel 3 
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guidelines/ 11-2003/ Doc8: 3) which, according to Moyo (2006; 18) stipulate 
that: 
The APRM process is designed to be open and participatory. Through a 
participatory process the APRM will engage key stakeholders to facilitate 
exchange of information and national dialogue on good governance and 
socio-economic development programmes, thereby increase the 
transparency of decision making process and build trust in the pursuit of 
national developmental goals. To ensure transparency and accountability in 
the APRM, rules and procedures will be developed and approved to guide 
the conduct of all stakeholders. These include code of conduct for all 
components of the APRM organisations and every review exercise must be 
technically competent, credible and free of political manipulation. 
The spirit of the APRM is based on the concept of deliberative democracy, 
which is important for consensus-building. King (2004) argues that deliberative 
democracy entails that decisions, whether personal or collective, ought to 
emerge from careful and informed judgements rather than, say, capricious 
choice or unreflective deference to prevailing opinion. Quality judgements on 
public matters might be improved by open exchange among different parties. 
This, of course, entails what McLennan and Ngoma (2004) argue requires a 
focus on the often contested space where leaders, public officials, citizens‘ 
interest groups and institutions negotiate the legitimacy and value decisions 
and processes related to development of growth. The motivation of this, 
according to Mc Lennan (2000), is that current notions on governance as the 
exercise of political and economic authority, has recently been associated with 
more distributed decision-making processes and structures that include 
government and civil society actors. 
It is the duty of each country participating in the APRM to organise a 
participatory and transparent process . According to Moyo (2006:12): 
In so doing, each participatory country must establish a focal point for 
APRM process, which should be at Ministerial level or a person that reports 
directly to the head of state or government. However, it is critical that the 
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work of the APRM focal point is inclusive, integrated and co-ordinated with 
existing policy decision making and medium term planning. 
The provision of an ―inclusive‖ process is meant to encourage participation of 
citizens to promote good governance. Most importantly, it has been argued by 
scholars like Mafumanisa (2004:492) that, ―A robust civil society is a clear 
indicator of a strong democracy and that to promote good governance; African 
governments need to strengthen citizens‘ involvement.‖ This argument is 
reinforced by Pope (2000:247) who argues that ―an informed citizenry aware 
of its rights and asserting them confidently is an underpinning to a national 
integrity system‖. An apathetic public, he argues ―ignorant of its rights and 
acquiescent in the face of administrative abuse, provides an ideal breeding 
ground for complacency and corruption‖. As already argued, to ensure 
broadened representation of the bigger section of the public, the APRM 
processes and structures at national level have a provision for representation 
of different stakeholders across the board . 
Zimbabwe has not yet volunteered to undergo a peer review but should it 
choose to do so in future, it will represent a unique opportunity for civil society 
to contribute in the shaping of the destination of their country. The process is 
well designed to reform governance because it presents an opportunity of 
interaction between all stakeholders. It should be noted that Zimbabwean civil 
society would have to safeguard against constraints that are usually faced by 
non-state actors in this initiative.  
Kayee (2003) in Moyo (2000) exposes the following obstacles to civil society 
participation: 
 There is inadequate information on civil society participation, which 
raises the concern as to whether government should define the role of 
civil society or the latter should shape their involvement based on the 
principles and guidelines of the APRM process. 
 There are concerns on how civil society representation occurred and 
in most cases governments have been accused of choosing less 
critical ones. 
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 Where civil society was granted full access to review process, e.g. 
Ghana, there has been concern regarding the level of representation 
of the rural communities 
There are, however, some scholars who argue that it is correct to have low 
key participation of civil society because in South Africa and Kenya, there 
were fears the CSOs in the peer review process ended up being co-opted by 
the government and thus silencing critical voices. Moyo (2006:17) indicates 
that, ―The question arises as to what kind of partnership is envisaged by CSOs 
with government in the review process? Does partnership with government 
presuppose co-option?‖ Critics like Kayee (2003) have argued that this has 
been worsened by the poor communication and information flow from the 
APRM Secretariat. He then identifies four areas that can be exploited by civil 
society. According to Kayee (2003, in Moyo, 2006), the following areas can be 
exploited: 
 During the first drafting of the national plan for self-assessment, civil 
society can offer their expertise. 
 Civil society and political groupings could gather existing information 
and material and commission new studies, where applicable, in order to 
be able to make informed and constructive formal submissions to the 
APRM panel on issues they regard as being critical governance 
challenges. 
 There is a need for a number of groups and individuals to lobby for a 
hearing during the country visit phase of the process. 
 There is a need for the media to cover the whole process and report 
accurately as well as give informed analysis and keep the public 
informed on the important governance issues that may otherwise be 
ignored. 
Moyo(2006) in his arguments for civil society participation in the APRM, 
highlights the following challenges facing the APRM: 
 The need to promote participation of all persons, particularly the 
minority and vulnerable groups. 
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 The need for institutionalisation of popular participation so that the 
process promotes people-centred development. 
 Ensuring consistency and co-ordination of national plans and 
procedures with international standards and obligations. 
 The need to promote equality, transparency and accountability. 
 Ensuring that the review process is outcome-oriented and focuses on 
the development of realistic national implementation strategy and plan. 
 Ensuring sustained national interest in the review process and how the 
benefit of the process can be promoted in order for countries to remain 
engaged 
Given the above opportunities, Zimbabwean CSOs have a duty of fitting into 
these to influence the peer review should the country volunteer to go through 
one. It must be noted that this will ensure that there is transparency in the 
whole process. Indeed, it fulfils the widely acclaimed principle by King 
(2004;25) that ―democracy is an ideal of popular sovereignty, according to 
which legitimacy is ultimately assessed in terms of judgements of those 
governed‖. Indeed, says King (2004) 
Democratic legitimacy public deliberation is vital because the authoritative 
decisions imposed by governments demand justification to those burdened 
by authority and justification must appeal to evidence and arguments 
acceptable to reasonable citizens. 
Zimbabweans, therefore, have an opportunity to influence good governance in 
the country through popularisation of public participation in the important 
African Union Policy initiatives like APRM. 
4.6.4 Pan African Parliament 
According to the AU strategic plan, the Pan African Parliament (PAP) offers 
another vital avenue for civil society participation in governance of Africa .PAP 
was established in March 2004 through Articles 5 and 7 of the Constitutive Act 
and the protocol to the Treaty Establishing the AEC and relating to the PAP. 
Article 7 of its founding charter speaks of the establishment of the Pan African 
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Parliament informed by the vision to provide a common platform for African 
peoples and their grassroots organisations to be more involved in discussion 
and decision-making on the problems and challenges facing the continent. It 
further mentions the promotion of democratic principles and popular 
participation as well as consolidation of democratic institutions and culture for 
sustainable democratic governance .Further to that, there is an indication that 
the establishment of PAP will ensure ―effectively the full participation of the 
African peoples in the economic and integration of the continent‖. 
According to Mutasa (2006:17): 
PAP provides a basis for the integration of regional policy initiatives into 
national legislation that in effect gives the parliamentarians a critical role in 
the overall policy implementation. The PAP, like ECOSOCC, is expected to 
play a crucial role in protecting human rights, consolidating democratic 
institutions and popularising and promoting good governance. 
He further argues that the parliament is expected to offer hope for a new era 
of transparency and accountability in African politics as opposition parties will 
be given official space in continental politics with opportunities to create 
alliance to exert pressure on autocratic governments. 
 In its objectives as outlined in Article 3 of the protocol PAP aims to  
Facilitate the effective implementation of the policies and objectives of the 
OAU/AEC and ultimately of the African Union. 
 To promote principles of human rights and democracy in Africa. 
 Encourage good governance, transparency and accountability in 
member states. 
 To familiarise the people of Africa with the objectives and policies 
aimed at integrating the African continent within the framework of the 
establishment of the Union. 
 To promote peace, security and stability. 
 To contribute to a more prosperous future for the people of Africa by 
promoting collective self-reliance and economic recovery. 
 To facilitate co-operation and development in Africa. 
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 To strengthen continental solidarity and build a sense of common 
destiny among the people of Africa. 
 To facilitate co-operation among Regional Economic Communities and 
their parliament forums. 
However, critics like Moyo (2006) argue that although the protocol of PAP 
refers to the participation of African peoples, there is no mention of the term 
―civil society‖ in the whole document and, further to that, there is no indication 
of how civil society will participate. He further argues that since Article 3 says 
the parliament will have consultative and advisory powers, it only gives it the 
function and status similar to that of ECOSOCC. This inevitably limits the 
space for participation of Zimbabwean civil society. The PAP, however, 
speaks of establishment of committees to assist in the discharge of its duties. 
These could provide the opportunity for participation of Zimbabwean civil 
society. According to the Zimbabwean ECOSOCC chapter (2006) unpublished 
Report ,the committees are  
 The Committee on Monetary and Financial Affairs  
  The Committee on Rural Economy, Agriculture, Natural Resources 
and Environment  
 e Committee on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters 
 The Committee on Co-operation, International Relations and Conflict 
Resolutions  
 The Committee on Transport, Industry, Communications, Energy, 
Science and Technology 
 The Committee on Health, Labour and Social Affairs 
 The Committee on Education, Culture, Tourism and Human Resources  
 The Committee on Gender, Family, Youth and People with Disabilities 
 The Committee on Justice and Human Rights  
 The Committee on Rules, Privileges and Discipline 
Civil society organisations from Zimbabwe can play a big role in these 
committees by influencing the crafting of policy in a manner that will suit the 
interest of their constituency. It is the burden of this research to unravel the 
avenues, opportunities and constraints for Zimbabwean civil society 
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participation in such policy organs of the PAP and other policy formulation 
organs of the AU. 
The committees are said to have started establishing links with like-minded 
organisations or parliaments in the world in line with Article 18 of the protocol 
which stipulates that: 
The Pan African Parliament shall work in close co-operation with the 
parliaments of the Regional Economic Communities and the National 
parliament or other deliberative organs of member of states. To this effect, 
the Pan African Parliament may, in accordance with its Rules of Procedure, 
convene annual consultative fora with parliaments of the Regional 
Economic Communities and the National Parliament or other deliberative 
organs to discuss matters of common interest. 
Moyo (2006), in his analysis of this protocol, argues, ―Why not do the same 
with civil society organisations?‖ He says it is thus not surprising that the entire 
Annual Report of PAP (2004-5) mentions civil society only once. To him the 
emerging fact is that the focus of PAP seems to be more inclined towards 
creating linkages with other parliamentary organisations across the world, with 
very little with the peoples of Africa. 
There are other spaces provided for participation of civil society in the 
protocol, e.g. that ―proceedings of the parliament shall be open to the public‖ 
(Article 4). Moyo (2006) argues that access is very important but affordability 
is also another question to be addressed. What mechanisms are in place to 
ensure that even those from remotest areas of Africa can access the Pan 
African Parliament? 
In order to address these issues and ensure that a broad-based section of the 
African people are represented in the PAP policy formulation, its Strategic 
Plan ( 2006-2010) the AU  asserts the following: 
The PAP represents the interests of various citizens, groups and social 
movements. For the role of representation to be effective, PAP will be 
required to collect and debate people‘s needs, concerns and anxieties and 
fears as well as to address them in the spirit and leadership of an institution 
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that seeks to promote co-operation, understanding and solidarity among the 
people of Africa. Moreover, the effective ownership of the AU objectives, 
policies and programmes squarely rests on how best citizens‘ voices will be 
listened to and heeded. This in turn will depend on the quality of information 
flows, parliament and creating the capacity of the PAP to respond 
imaginatively to the voices of the people of Africa. 
This is in line with the spirit deliberative democracy which desires 
strengthening of public sphere through citizens‘ participation.  
The PAP‘s desire for people-centred participation in policy-making is 
buttressed by its declaration in the Strategic Plan when it declares: 
PAP seeks to build a people‘s parliament that is responsive to the need of 
all people of Africa. PAP must ensure that there is full participation of the 
African people in parliamentary activities. These include PAP visits, 
regional seminars and workshops which will sensitise citizens about the 
principles, policies and developmental programmes as well as the 
discussion on the importance of regional co-operation and integration. 
Moreover, PAP outreach activities must facilitate the exchange of views 
with stakeholders on the progress made, obstacles encountered and to 
participate in recommending the way forward. By doing so, PAP, Regional 
Parliaments, National Parliaments and civil society organisations must 
deepen their understanding of the principles of subsidiary, harmonisation of 
policies and the availability of mechanisms for promoting regional co-
operation and integration. 
It is therefore the burden of this research to unravel how that given these 
spaces for civil society participation in PAP, how far has the Zimbabwean 
CSOs managed to utilise this space in order to influence the policy formulation 
at the continental body. The parliaments, according to Ginwala (2003): 
must see themselves as both the custodians and promoters of democratic 
values and assume responsibilities for consolidating democracy. They 
provide the interface between the executive and civil society for interaction 
with executive on an ongoing basis. Equally and on the same basis they 
must interact with civil society and be informed by it. 
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It is in this spirit that this research seeks to identify opportunities and 
constraints for Zimbabwean civil society organisations in the policy making 
organs of the African Union 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on literature that informs the current study. The literature 
is important in modern governance to ensure meaningful and active 
participation of citizens in policy formulation. The African Union is, however, 
shown as an institution that has limited spaces for participation of African 
peoples in its policy initiatives. This, by extension, shows that there are 
barriers to influencing AU policy decisions by Zimbabwean CSOs due to the 
limited spaces. 
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Chapter 5: Interpretation and Analysis of Data 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an in-depth interpretation and analysis of data derived 
from a qualitative enquiry conducted on twenty senior managers of twenty civil 
society organisations operating in the area of promoting democracy and good 
governance in Zimbabwe. The results show a very interesting and informative 
discovery on the operations of Zimbabwean CSOs and inter-governmental 
institutions of the African Union. This chapter thus makes an interpretive 
analysis of the same with a view to deriving conclusions that will avail the 
opportunities and constraints for Zimbabwean civil society the in their quest to 
participate in the shaping of the AU policy programmes. The interpretation 
below is derived from responses to the questions fielded from the 
questionnaire attached in this report as Appendix 1. 
5.2 Background 
The enquiry first sought to determine some personal information about the 
respondents. This was viewed as important in that one's personal background, 
history and, sometimes, gender affects their outlook and interpretation of 
certain situations. This is also true of the level of education attained by the 
respondents. Usually the higher the level of education attained, the easier one 
views and interprets situations to do with continental and global issues. This, 
however, is not to place a blanket dismissal of the less educated on their 
understanding, of lack of it, of global issues. It is only to state the obvious. 
As already alluded to in the background statement, interviews were conducted 
on 20 senior personnel of 20 CSOs dealing with issues of democracy and 
good governance. Of the 20 personnel, 14 were male while six were female. 
This represented 70% and 30% males and females respectively. While this 
gender discrepancy may be viewed as common in Zimbabwean everyday 
reality of gender issues, it cannot go without mentioning that it represents the 
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reality of a patriarchal society. Over the years, especially in rural Zimbabwe, 
there has been a systematic discrimination of the girl child in education 
development. While this trend has changed of late, it had a ravaging effect on 
the number of females who made it to tertiary level. This, by extension, 
inevitably continues to affect the number of women in senior management due 
to skills shortage amongst them.  
The ages of the respondents were between 31 and 50.The majority, some 
65% were in the category of 31-40 while only 35% were in the age range 41-
50.All of them had however attained some tertiary level of education 
reinforcing an important issue that Zimbabwe has invested heavily in the 
education sector. While it is common in most African countries in Africa to 
have senior manager having lesser qualifications, it is rare to have this 
happening in Zimbabwe due to abundance of well educated and skilled labour. 
It goes without saying that the Zimbabwean investments in the education 
sector are one of the best in Africa. The age range of the respondents, 
coupled with their high levels of education and high positions at work made a 
very good reservoir to provide well informed and useful. 
Figure 5.1: Gender Representation  
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5.3 Organisational Information 
The enquiry also solicited organisational information. This was important for 
the exercise because organisational strength and development is important in 
determining its level of interaction and influence on policy developments. 
Organisations that are well-developed and have a skilled human resource 
tend to have more influence on policy issues at national and global level. The 
information sought also helped to understand and categorise the organisations 
by line of programming, geographic area of operation as well as the number of 
years in operation. 
5.3.1 Programme Activities 
Of the 20 organisations subjected to the enquiry, 60% were mainly involved in 
human rights and good governance issues, 25% in youth participation in 
governance, 10% in election issues, while 5% specifically dealt with issues of 
women participation in politics. Those that deal with issues of human rights 
and good governance are involved in providing space for citizens to make 
informed discussions on the governance of the country. The spaces they 
provide are important given the background of draconian legislation in the 
country. These organisations also lobby for promotion of human rights issues 
in an environment where the government is known for violation of the human 
rights. Those that deal with youths participation in governance are geared 
towards providing space for the youths to have a meaningful influence on the 
way the country is governed .They do this through youth leadership 
programmes and lobby campaigns to ensure that the youths have a serious 
say in the governance of the country. These organisations also encourage and 
assist young political activists who want to get into political office by raising 
resources and campaign materials. The ones involved in elections are a watch 
dog on the implementation of the electoral laws, they have also been very 
influential in the lobby for change of electoral laws from the previous one that 
were unfair to the current ones that are accommodative. They are also 
involved in the monitoring of elections. The ones dealing with women 
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participation in elections are out to ensure that spaces are created for women 
to also have a contest for public political positions. This selection indicates a 
deliberate bias by the researcher to deal specifically with organisations whose 
brand foci is democratisation and opening avenues for citizens‘ participation in 
governance. These are organisations that are aimed at opening the public 
space in line with the concept of deliberative democracy.   
Figure 5.2: Programme Activities 
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5.3.2 Number of Years in Operation 
The organisations scrutinised have been in existence for some time. More 
than half (55%) have been in existence for above 10 years. A quarter of these 
have been in existence for over five years while the rest have been there for 
less than four years. This is well represented in Figure 5.3 below. These 
organisations represent an important sample because they are mature and 
well established and as such expected to have vibrant programs that go 
beyond their communities. These institutions are well and best placed to 
interact and influence polices not only at national or continental level but also 
at national level. This is premised on the assumption that the longer the 
organisation is in existence the more it perfects its programming and 
administrative ability to deal with issues that go beyond their normal 
communities of operation. 
Figure 5.3: Years in Operation 
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5.3.3 Position in Organisation  
The interviews were conducted on well-placed and influential figures of the 
selected organisations. This was important as the respondents had to be 
articulate and well-informed on the operations and systems of the 
organisation. This approach ensured that the information obtained was a good 
basis for the interpretation of the organisation‘s position on the issues under 
enquiry. Of the 20 interviewed, 85% were Directors, 10% Programme 
Managers while only 5% were Programme Officers. It was the desire of the 
researcher to have a 100% return rate from the most senior people in the 
organisations, but this was not to be the case as, in some of the organisations, 
the, most senior personnel were not available at that particular time. Figure 
5.4 below represents the allocation of positions of respondents by posts. What 
is also very important about these respondents is that they have been at these 
organisations for a long time. For example, of the 20 interviewed, 13 (65%) 
had been with the organisations for over five years while others have been 
there for over three years. 
Figure 5.4: Position in Organisation 
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5.3.4 Geographic area of operation 
As shown in Figure 5.5, the organisations interviewed had a vast geographic 
area of operation. For instance, 60% operated nationally, 30% communally 
while only 10% were regionally based. This is an important programming 
geographic spread in that the views obtained will be a representation a huge a 
population of diversity.  
Figure 5.5: Geographical Area of Operation 
 
5.4 Institutional spaces for participation 
Of the 20 organisations interviewed, 75% indicated that there were some 
institutional mechanisms for participation of Zimbabwean CSOs in the AU 
policy initiatives while 25% (five) said they were not aware of any (see Figure 
5.6). Of the 75% who said they knew about the existence, 55% indicated that 
they knew NEPAD as an institutional structure provided for the participation of 
CSOs in the programme initiatives of the continent. This can be attributed to 
the fact that a Zimbabwe NEPAD Chapter has been established and has held 
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some meetings to try and co-ordinate the CSOs‘ participation in the AU policy 
initiatives. To that end, a number of Zimbabwean CSOs have a least heard of 
the existence as well as functions of NEPAD, even though very few of them 
have actively been involved. Very few knew of the existence of ECOSOCC as 
the space provided for CSOs‘ participation, a very disturbing phenomenon in 
that it is the official platform for CSOs to interface with the inter-governmental 
initiatives .Further to this, a Zimbabwean chapter of ECOSOC was launched in 
2006, yet so few organisations know it as an official channel for CSOs‘ 
participation in the AU policy agenda. Another 20% knew of APRM as 
providing the necessary space for CSOs participation. This is understandable 
given the fact that Zimbabwe has not volunteered to undergo a peer review. 
This figure is, however, encouraging in that it shows interest in the APRM 
process and, as such, should Zimbabwe volunteer to under go one, we are 
likely to see some active and useful involvement of civil society. Another 
disturbing phenomenon was that only five percent knew of the PAP as an 
avenue for CSOs expansion of their influence on the AU policy direction. 
Parliaments, whether national or continental, must work closely with citizens. 
They are supposed to discuss issues that include input from citizens, but the 
PAP is a problematic one in that it seems to be divorced from the populace, 
hence the ignorance by many CSOs about its existence. 
Figure 5.6 : Awareness of Institutional Spaces for CSOs Participation 
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Figure 5.7: Spaces for Participation 
 
  
5.4.1 Framework for collective engagement  
Most of the respondents indicated that there is no co-ordinated national CSOs 
movement for effective engagement in the African Union policy agenda. This 
can be attributed to individual approach to programming by most CSOs in the 
country. A number of CSOs have a ―do-it-alone syndrome" and this affects any 
form of possible co-operation when it comes to international affairs. The other 
reason for this is the weak link by the Zimbabwean ECOSSOC chapter, which, 
besides being some form of an elitist club of CSOs, is also virtually derelict 
and dysfunctional. It is also significant to note that some of the CSOs attend 
the functions of the AU as nothing but tourists attending pre-summit 
demonstrations rather than contributing to the policy outlook of the AU. The 
20% who indicated knowledge of the co-ordinated national network were not 
even able to explain how it functions. If anything, they were referring to a 
"grouping" that goes as an unorganised "gang‖ to demonstrate during the 
heads of government summits‖. The failure by the Zimbabwean chapter of 
ECOSOCC to rein together the national CSOs into a single effective voice of 
has inevitably affected the influence of Zimbabwean CSOs in the African state 
of affairs. Figure 5.8 below represents percentage points of people who 
indicated knowledge of a co-ordinated network against those who did not. 
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Figure 5.8: Framework for collective engagement 
 
 
 
5.4.2 Engagement between the AU organs and CSOs 
70% (14) of the 20 respondents indicated that there is no interaction between 
them and the AU while six said there was. However, upon further enquiry, it 
emerged that the group that said there is interaction between them and the 
AU, mainly referred to the AU-CSOs pre-summit conferences. This interaction 
is, however, not effective as it is only at protest level and does not constitute a 
serious engagement that directs policy. This, again, is a cause for concern as 
it shows glaring weaknesses of ECOSOCC as an organ that provides space 
for CSOs interface with the AU .The creation of the Zimbabwean chapter of 
ECOSOCC was supposed to be the link in promoting the participation of 
CSOs in the governance of the continent but the Zimbabwean situation tells a 
different tale as the chapter does little, if any, to link the CSOs to the AU policy 
programmes. 
The six (30%) that made indications about interaction said the relationship 
was limiting because their role was of an advisory nature and did not really 
shape the policy developments of the African Union. This is fairly 
understandable because the interaction they make is only through the AU 
CSOs pre-summit conferences and has little, at all, to do with the vital organs 
of the AU. The respondents had a bit of information about ECOSOCC 
because they had attended the Zimbabwe launch, but they did not know much 
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about how to interface through its structures. It also emerged that they had no 
knowledge of such structures like the PRC and the Commission, among 
others. To that end, they said this interaction is very limiting for policy 
development because it is outside the arena of influential organs. In their 
admission, they said their interaction with AU had very little influence on the 
policy development dynamics of the African Union. 
5.4.3 Government and CSOs relationship 
Seventeen of the twenty respondents (85%) indicated that the relationship 
between the CSOs and the government of Zimbabwe was bad as the two 
institutions viewed each other with suspicion (see Figure 5.9). The 
government, it was said, views the CSOs movement as an extension of the 
opposition political front working in cohort with the opposition Movement For 
Democratic Change (MDC) to effect what they term ―illegal regime change‖. 
The government of Zimbabwe, under siege from the domestic and 
international communities due to its unpopular and undemocratic policies, has 
turned its fingers on anyone opposed to its views.  
Figure 5.9: CSOs government relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CSOs, who are at the forefront for demanding space for citizens participation 
in governance, have become targets of government‘s vitriol. In some 
instances, the state has accused the CSOs of being the recipients of foreign 
funding that is then channelled to the MDC. Zimbabwean legislation governing 
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the operation of political parties prohibits foreign funding of political parties. On 
the other hand, CSOs view the government as being undemocratic, closing all 
spaces and avenues for citizens‘ participation in policy-decisions that affect 
their lives. They argue that all they are fighting for is to facilitate active and 
meaningful participation of citizens in the way they are governed. 
 
Each of the two groups holds their views so strongly that it makes it almost too 
impossible for them to work meaningfully as development partners. Some 
(15%), however, indicated that, as far as they knew the relations between the 
government and CSOs were fair, as they claimed knowledge of some 
collaborative work between the two during some emergencies .They singled 
out the CSOs and government collaboration in dealing with national disasters, 
like the cholera pandemic and cyclone Elaine, which hit the country in 2003. 
However this kind of forced collaboration, induced by emergencies, cannot be 
used as a measure of sustainable co-operation. 
5.4.4 AU policy stages needing CSO attention 
The enquiry further sought to understand which of the policy stages were the 
most vital and, as such, seeking the greatest attention from the CSOs. The 
stages that were selected were the policy development stage, policy 
implementation and policy evaluation stages. A sizeable number (85%) of the 
respondents indicated that they viewed all stages as very important, 10% said 
the policy implementation stage was the most vital, while 5% indicated that it 
was the policy evaluation stage.  
The 85% who identified the policy development stage as the most vital, 
argued that it was important to influence policies from the time they are 
developed. This way, they argued, it is possible to influence the whole content 
of the policies. They further argued that the stage on policy formulation 
provides a framework for the operationalisation of the policies and, as such, it 
is important to have serious influence on this stage. Having worked on the 
same, they argued that it was important to have influence on the 
implementation of polices. This is vital because a grand policy plan can be 
developed, only to be destroyed due to poor implementation. The 
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implementation of polices, they argue, is very important be cause it is the 
period when the people's aspirations as represented in the policy framework 
are translated to practical action. It is also vital to ensure that there is active 
participation of citizens in the policy monitoring and evaluation stage because 
it is at the stage that measurements are done on the actual success of the 
policy initiative. However, there was 10% who felt it was the policy 
implementation that was the single most important stage, while some 5% felt 
the evaluation stage was the single most crucial stage. The outcome of this 
enquiry where some 85% ably identified all stages as crucial is important for 
the Zimbabwean CSOs in that it should teach them that to influence polices at 
the AU, there is need to be active at all stages of the process. It is, however, 
important to note that despite 85% ably identifying all stages as vital; they 
were unable to identify specific spaces for CSOs participation in each of the 
stages. 
5.5 Nature of relationships 
As shown in Figure 5.10, 85% indicated that they viewed this relationship as 
limitative for effective engagement in the AU policy organs. Three (15%) of the 
respondents said it was facilitative because where there was collaboration 
with the government, it was easy to have the views transmitted to the 
influential organs of the AU. The group that viewed the relationship as 
limitative (85%) argued that the fact that the AU is established as an inter-
state organ makes it problematic for Zimbabwean CSOs to have effective 
influence on its policy organs. The AU works through the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs of various states and CSOs are expected to channel their views 
through their respective ministries. In countries like Zimbabwe, where there is 
a cat-and-mouse relationship, this is difficult to attain as there is no platform 
between the government and the CSOs collaboration. The net result is that 
the relationship vastly limits the Zimbabwean CSOs‘ contribution to the AU 
policy affairs. 
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Figure 5.10: Nature of Relations: Limitative or facilitative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5.1 Mechanisms for strengthening relations  
Thirteen (65%) of the 20 CSOs interviewed indicated that the allegations that 
a number of CSOs were aligned to the opposition was true and there is a need 
for the CSOs to remain neutral .They said CSOs have to understand that they 
are there to assist government and not replace it and, as such, they should not 
work too closely to forces that are working to replace it. Five (25%) 
respondents indicated that the Government and CSOs must start some 
collaborative work in a number of areas to boost relations .They said this work 
has to be well-planned and not just during emergencies. Two (10%) 
respondents indicated the need for a series of meetings between CSOs and 
Foreign Affairs Ministries to decide on collective approaches to contributions 
to the AU policy programmes. See Figure 5.11. 
 
These responses are important in that they ably identify that collaboration 
between the government and CSOs is vital for development of an engagement 
framework that will facilitate the latter‘s influence of the AU policy initiatives 
(see Figure 5.12). What came out in this enquiry is that there is a need for 
CSOs to strengthen their role as the watchdogs of the citizens and not align 
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themselves with opposition political parties. They have to be neutral in their 
conduct of business as this will allow for good collaboration with government. 
This way, they can make their representations into the continental bodies 
through the official and acceptable organs. 
Figure 5.11: How to improve relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.12: Collaborative approach 
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5.5.2 How CSOs can strengthen AU policies  
Twelve (60%) of the respondents submitted that there is a need for improving 
relations with government so as to influence the national foreign policy, while 
also contributing to inputs on regional and international bodies. They indicated 
that the establishment of the AU as an inter-state organ makes it inevitable for 
the CSOs to improve relations with the government, if they are to make a 
meaningful impact in their attempts to influence polices at AU. Two (10%) of 
the respondents indicated that meaningful contribution can only be achieved if 
CSOs engage at other critical organs of the AU, e.g. the Commission, and not 
only at the level of the provided spaces like ECOSOCC. They said ECOSOCC 
was not properly coordinated to effectively assist in policy formulation. Another 
10% said this can be achieved if the institutions become part of a broad-based 
coalition that can speak with one voice. This approach can assist the 
organisations to be taken more seriously, unlike when they operate 
individually. Three (15%) of the respondents indicated that this was attainable 
if they actively participated in the AU-initiated conferences and initiatives like 
NEPAD, APRM and ECOSOCC, among others. Only one (10%) of the 
respondents mentioned that this can be done through improving information-
sharing with organisations that have potential to contribute but do not have the 
necessary resources and exposure, is necessary for attainment of this goal.  
Figure 5.13 below represents percentages of how respondents think CSOs 
can meaningfully contribute to the AU on international affairs. 
Figure 5.13: Ways of contribution to AU 
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5.5.3 Adequate resources  
Eighteen (90%) of the respondents indicated that there were minimal 
resources, mainly because of the unstable economic environment. Most 
indicated that while they got funding from external partners, the obtaining 
environment vastly affected their operations. They indicated that banking 
regulations forced them to forcibly convert their donor funds to Zimbabwean 
dollars at uncompetitive rates. In some instances, they claimed, the 
government forcibly liquidated funds in their foreign currency accounts without 
consultations. This inevitably affected their operations as planning for 
programming became a nightmare. Two (10%) of the respondents said poor 
relations between government and CSOs also affect the inflow of resources 
for CSOs because in other countries, where relations are good, the 
government actually assists the CSOs with some resources to engage in the 
AU policy organs.  
Figure 5.14: Resource Base 
 
 
 
5.5.4 Structures for effective networking 
Asked on how to improve the structures for effective networking 12 (60%) of 
the respondents said there is no well-organised CSOs structure, while three 
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(15%) said the national chapter of ECOSOCC is derelict and was not helpful in 
promoting networking by the CSOs. The same was said by two (10%) 
respondents who said the national coalition of NGOs is seriously ineffective 
and heavily compromised to assist in proper co-ordination of CSOs. Three 
(15%) of the respondents said the National Association of Non-governmental 
Organisations (NANGO) network can be best described as elitist as it seems 
to ignore the interests of community-based institutions. This properly explains 
the challenges of the CSOs to influence policies at AU because the problems 
presented by the militancy of the government against CSOs require a well co-
ordinated approach if they are to make any impact in policy-making.  
Figure 5.15: Structures for effective networking 
 
 
5.5.5 Human resources  
Sixteen (80%) of the respondents indicated that there is minimal utilisation of 
the human resources (HR) in influencing the AU policy framework because 
there is little involvement of the same in the think-tank. Four (20%) said they 
see the utilisation of the skilled labour force through their use in the AU 
commissions. To that end, recommendations were made for the CSOs and 
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AU to tap the African human resource into various think-tank organs of the AU 
programmes. This should also involve the African skilled labour force in the 
Diaspora in different initiatives and programmes of the AU. There is also a 
need to engage the skilled African manpower as consultants in AU 
programmes. 
Figure 5.16 : Skilled human resource utilisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5.6 The major constraints 
Fourteen of the respondents said the structuring of the AU architecture, in 
which it acts as an inter-state organisation, restricts the CSOs contributions on 
its policy initiatives. Two indicated that the bad blood between Zimbabwean 
CSOs and the government affects, in a big way, and destroys the possibility of 
CSOs to effectively influence the Foreign Affairs Ministry‘s contributions to 
international affairs. One respondent said the AU organs do not publish their 
activities and spaces effectively to allow for active participation by CSOs. 
Three of the respondents submitted that the lack of a consolidated strong 
national network to lobby and approach African Union Affairs with one voice 
affects the effectiveness of the CSOs to influence policies a the AU. 
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The overwhelming confirmation is that the establishment of the AU as an inter-
state organ grossly restricts the participation of CSOs in policy-making. This 
forces the CSOs to find alternative routes. The existence of strained relations 
between the government and CSOs is not helping the situation either. It is, 
thus, urgent for a compromise in relations if they are to effectively contribute in 
AU policy-making. It is also important that given the clear blockade, the 
alternative routes for engagement should include, but not limited to, the 
ECOSOCC and the Commission. There is also a need for CSOs to ensure 
that they develop themselves into a well co-ordinated powerful bloc to lobby 
for space. 
5.5.7 The major opportunities  
Seventeen submitted that the creation of ECOSOCC as a body to specifically 
deal with CSOs issues presents an opportunity for Zimbabwean CSOs. Three 
indicated that the recent attempts by the PAP to create a CSOs-AU interface 
facility is also a major opportunity for Zimbabwean CSOs. The establishment 
of an all-inclusive government in Zimbabwe presents a grand opportunity for 
mending of relations between the CSOs and the government. Availability of 
other organs for engagement in the AU structures was also singled out as a 
major opportunity for CSOs. 
The above responses clearly indicate that there are strong opportunities for 
Zimbabwean CSOs to improve their chances of influencing the policy outlook 
of the AU. This can be done through organs like ECOSOCC and PAP. There 
is, however, a need for strengthening of the local chapter of ECOSOCC if it is 
to be effective. The chapter also has to vigorously publicise its activities and 
reach out to community-based organisations as well. The chapter is currently 
viewed as an elitist club. Another opportunity provided for the CSOs is the 
establishment of an all-inclusive government which has seen big strides being 
made towards democratisation. The new government is willing to engage with 
the citizens and the CSOs must seize the opportunity to establish a new 
friendly relationship with the government. This is the single most important 
opportunity in that the CSOs will finally be able to work with the Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs in providing some policy contributions for the AU .These are 
likely to get more attention that those coming through the weaker structures. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The chapter dealt at length with interpretation and analysis of responses from 
a number of selected CSOs dealing with issues of governance. As already 
discussed in the chapter, the study revealed glaring weaknesses in the way 
the African Union IGI are designed when it comes to facilitation of 
Zimbabwean CSOs‘ participation in the AU policy initiatives. The study also 
revealed important findings on how negative Zimbabwean CSOs and 
government relations have impacted on the ability of the CSOs to effectively 
influence the AU policy agenda. It reaches important conclusions that lack of 
democratic governance in Zimbabwe greatly affects the way the CSOs can 
influence policy at continental level. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents findings, recommendations and conclusions that are 
derived from the outcomes of the analysis and interpretation of primary and 
secondary data derived from the qualitative research. The researcher set out 
to make an enquiry on the issues affecting the meaningful participation of 
Zimbabwean CSOs in influencing the AU policy initiatives. This was meant to 
a make determination on how the CSOs can make alternative strategies for 
engagement given the blockage arising from the creation of the AU as an  
inter state organ. The research was done using a qualitative method and saw 
twenty civil society organisations managers being interviewed using a 
questionnaire. The interviews were done face to face by the researcher .The 
research also used important statutes from the AU for strengthening of the 
research. The data collected showed that there is a need for the CSOs to 
bridge the gap and work with government if they are to be effective in 
influencing the AU policy outlook. In the absence of this, the data shows that 
the CSOs must direct their engagement through spaces provided like 
ECOSOCC but these spaces also have to be strengthened and they are 
currently weak.   
6.2 Key Findings 
The analysis of data provided from research presents some important insights 
that are very useful in the understanding of the operations of the African 
Union. According to conclusions reached in a similar study commissioned by 
the Southern Africa Trust in 2006, the following conclusion was reached  
Although participating, stakeholder involvement, empowerment and 
ownership are concepts that have gained popularity in Africa, especially 
when it relates to the relationship between the governed and governors, 
there is a danger that they become catchwords. Deliberate efforts have to 
be made to achieve a common understanding of the vision, philosophy and 
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strategies of Africa and its development priorities. Mutual trust is also 
critical if the AU-people partnership is to be genuine .There is need to 
strengthen information and communication channels between AU 
headquarters and the CSOs. 
The conclusions derived from this research also point to a need for a 
strengthening of engagement mechanisms between Zimbabwean CSOs and 
IGI of the AU if meaningful citizen participation is to be achieved. The major 
findings derived from this study are outlined in the following paragraphs. 
Most of employees in the Zimbabwean civil society movement are well-
educated with degree qualifications. The majority (70%) are males. They are 
within the middle-age and have good understanding of international affairs. 
Their high level of education, together with their age, impacted positively on 
the research as they were able to understand and interpret the research 
questions without much problem. This contributed to a 100% questionnaire 
return rate .This impressive high return rate came with exceptionally high and 
informative quality of responses. The conclusion derived from this is that 
skilled personnel are very productive and useful in conceptualisation of issues, 
an ingredient that is important for organisational growth. 
The study revealed that some Zimbabwean CSOs have some knowledge and 
ideas about the existence of institutional mechanisms for CSOs‘ participation 
in the AU architecture. However, what they term ―mechanisms‖ are non-
productive pre-AU conferences summits which merely engage in 
demonstrations and have no impact or influence on the AU policy direction. 
What emerges is that there is minimal popularisation of spaces for active 
citizens' engagement with the AU structures.  
It emerges form the study that ECOSOCC, which is the official statutory body 
for CSOs‘ participation in the AU policy structures, is just a "latent giant waiting 
to be discovered". It turned out from the study the Zimbabwean chapter of 
ECOSOCC, which is supposed to link the CSOs–AU interface is not only 
obsolete, but also completely derelict and dysfunctional. This inevitably affects 
the active participation of Zimbabwean CSOs in the African Union affairs. 
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Some CSOs were aware of the existence of AU inter-governmental initiatives 
like the PAP, APRM and NEPAD, but these initiatives seemed too far away 
from their reach there seems to be some structural difficulties which alienates 
Zimbabwean citizens from these initiatives. The conclusion reached here is 
that the African Union IGIs are some kind of elitist bodies that have a 
disconnection with the masses of Zimbabwe. For example, the PAP, which 
must, through national representatives, facilitate citizens‘ promotion in its 
programmes, has no structure for citizens‘ engagement. These kinds of 
relationships were found to be very limiting for effective collective continental 
policing. 
The study further reveals that there is a strong desire by CSOs to participate 
in all the policy processes of the African Union. This represents a paradigm 
shift from the traditional norms where CSOs were interested in policy 
formulation only. This desire has, however, not been complemented by any 
solid practical engagement, as there are limited spaces and avenues in the 
African Union. 
The study unravelled reasons for the strained relationship between the CSOs 
and the government of Zimbabwe. It was discovered that this strained 
relationship has a negative impact on the CSOs‘ ability to contribute to the AU 
policy outlook. The AU, being an inter-state organisation, engages with 
governments and has limited space for non-state actors. The CSOs are, 
therefore, supposed to engage through the government but in Zimbabwe, this 
is difficult because the government and CSOs are sworn enemies. The study 
ably identifies that the root cause for this animosity is lack of political trust 
between the two institutions. The government has a strong belief that the 
CSOs have deviated from their traditional role and have become an 
appendage of the opposition political parties. The CSOs have been lumped 
together with what the government terms "agents of regime change‖ and 
puppets of the West bent on destabilising and uprooting a democratically 
elected government. It emerged from the study that the government feels 
strongly about this conspiracy theory and, as such, would not co-operate with 
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CSOs .This kind of relationship, it emerged is a major stumbling block for 
Zimbabwean CSOs to effectively influence the policy direction of the AU . 
The study revealed that while there are some spaces that are provided for 
Zimbabwean CSOs‘ participation in the AU, it was not possible to have 
meaningful impact unless the CSOs use the government as the conduit of 
these views. To that end, the study concluded that the CSOs have to come 
out clean from the allegations of being an opposition political front and stand 
out as a neutral body that promotes developmental issues in their 
constituencies. Where they engage in issues to promote good governance, it 
has to be genuine campaign, not ones that are aimed at promoting opposition 
political movements. The work concluded that there must be a collaborative 
framework for co-operation between the CSOs and the government when it 
comes to approaching the African Union affairs. If this collaboration is 
achieved, the CSOs can make effective use of spaces provided for by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs department. This way, they can engage at the level 
of the Commission, PRC and the Assembly. This approach will contribute 
meaningfully to strengthening of Zimbabwean CSOs‘ participation and 
contribution to the AU policy outlook. 
It emerged from the study that, among a cocktail of constraints for 
Zimbabwean CSOs‘ participation in the AU, the following are the key and 
major ones: 
 The construction of the AU as an inter-state organisation limits the 
participation of Zimbabwean non-state actors in the AU policy framework. 
 The bad relation between the Zimbabwean CSOs and the government 
heavily handicaps the CSOs from contributing to the AU through the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 The constitution of the AU as an advisory body is problematic in that it 
limits the influence the Zimbabwean CSOs can influence the AU policy 
developments. 
 The lack of a strong consolidated network to lobby as a collective on 
engagement mechanisms is also a major hindrance to Zimbabwean CSOs‘ 
endeavour to influence the AU policy outlook. 
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 The ineffective utilisation of abundant Zimbabwean skilled human resource 
to work as think-tank on policy issues.  
The study shows that despite the constraints, a number of opportunities exist 
for Zimbabwean CSOs to influence the AU policy initiatives. Key among them 
is the recent creation of an all-inclusive government between ZANU PF and 
the two MDC formations. This government is likely to level the political 
landscape and offer an opportunity for mending of relations between the 
government and the CSOs. This will then assist CSOs influence Zimbabwean 
government policy inputs to the AU. 
6.3 Recommendations 
In view of the conclusions drawn from this study, the researcher makes the 
following recommendations: 
 The notion of deliberative democracy and inclusion of citizens in 
governance is an important tenet of African development and must be a 
strong base in the way the AU engages with citizens from different 
countries. 
 There is a need to strengthen and facilitate the activities of the ECOSOCC 
chapter in Zimbabwe. This chapter will have to publicise its existence and 
keep an updated database of its membership. It will have to improve the 
communication systems and co-ordination with the member organisations. 
 The National Association of Non-governmental organisations must 
immediately seek a meeting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the new 
coalition government. This meeting should immediately create a 
collaborative framework for normalisation of relations between the CSOs 
and the Government. 
 Zimbabwean CSOs should familiarise themselves with other organs of the 
AU, .e.g. the PRC, Executive Council and the Commission and ensure that 
they establish partnerships at that level. 
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 The Zimbabwean CSOs should utilise its abundant human resource to 
create a think-tank to generate new views on African Union issues. 
 There is need for Zimbabwean CSOs, through their national coalition, to 
mobilise resources and create a central pool to ensure that the 
organisations that want to participate in the AU policy initiatives are well-
supported. 
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6.4 Conclusions 
This work sought to locate spaces for participation of Zimbabwean CSOs in 
the broad framework of the AU policy agenda. The work is crucial, given the 
strained relations that characterise the Zimbabwean government and the 
CSOs.  
The relationships ,as already defined in some quarters here, is characterised 
by intense suspicions as each part views the other as working counter to its 
interests. This work is important particularly as it sought to determine how the 
African Union has gone in terms of promoting the doctrine of deliberative 
democracy.  
The study was premised on one important factor, that deliberative democracy 
is an important doctrine in modern governance systems as it seeks to open 
avenues and spaces for participation of all citizens in governance. 
Deliberative democracy recognises that governance is not just about the 
elected representatives called government but it consists a multiple layers of 
various players with different interests to the state. The work sought to 
emphatically state that this is not only applicable to the national governments 
but also other public bodies like the AU. 
It is important to note that, while the study ascertained the availability of some 
spaces for Zimbabwean citizens participation in African Affairs, it was 
discovered that these spaces were not wide open for any meaningful 
engagement. The structures and these spaces can be best defined as derelict 
and, as such, unable to assist in promoting inclusion of Zimbabwean citizens 
in the African Union policy agenda.  
Given the derelict nature of these organs, the other possible entry point for 
influencing the AU agenda is through the government of Zimbabwe, but this is 
difficult as the government has closed out any meaningful interaction with the 
CSOs. This has inevitably worked against Zimbabwean CSOs‘ contribution to 
the policy direction of the continental body. 
Further to that, Zimbabwean citizens have been denied an opportunity to 
contribute in the way they want to be governed at a continental level. The 
work, however, reveals that all is not lost as there are opportunities to mend 
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relations between the government and CSOs by the new inclusive 
government. It will also be vital to improve the modus operandi of the IGIs of 
the AU to make them more functional. This way, Zimbabwean CSOs can be 
able to amplify their voices on how they want to be governed at continental 
level.  
It is suggested that future researchers can study on how the SADC civil 
society organisations can create synergies and structures to effectively 
influence ways in which SADC can collectively influence the African Union 
policy-making. 
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